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1 
FIGHT TERROR, NOT TWITTER: 
INSULATING SOCIAL MEDIA FROM MATERIAL 
SUPPORT CLAIMS 
 
NINA I. BROWN

 
 
Social media companies face a new threat: as millions of users around 
the globe use their platforms to exchange ideas and information, so do 
terrorists.  Terrorist groups, such as ISIS, have capitalized on the ability to 
spread propaganda, recruit new members, and raise funds through social 
media at little to no cost.  Does it follow that when these terrorists attack, 
social media is on the hook for civil liability to victims? 
Recent lawsuits by families of victims killed in terrorist attacks 
abroad have argued that the proliferation of terrorists on social media—and 
social media’s reluctance to stop it—violates the Antiterrorism Act.  This 
article explores the dangers associated with holding social media 
companies responsible for such attacks and offers a solution to avoid 
liability. 
This is a new challenge for social media and there is little to no 
scholarship on the topic.  This article examines the basis for this liability—
the Antiterrorism Act—as it relates to suits against social media and 
section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which provides that an 
interactive computer service (broadly defined to include a variety of 
websites, including social media platforms) cannot be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of third-party content. 
This article argues that section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act should provide immunity for social media outlets from suits based on 
the actions of its users.  This is in spite of the fact that courts have 
traditionally interpreted section 230 to immunize content providers for 
liability from the content posted by third parties, as opposed to the acts of 
those parties themselves. 
 
                                                          

Assistant Professor, S.I. Newhouse School of Public Communications, Syracuse University, 215 
University Place, Syracuse, NY 13244. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Carl Fields, a military contractor stationed in Amman, Jordan, was 
shot and killed while eating lunch in the staff cafeteria of the police-
training center where he worked.
1
  Although the gunman appeared to be 
acting alone, ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack.  Carl’s widow 
blames Twitter.   
She argues that the fault lies with Twitter because it knowingly 
permitted “ISIS to use its social network as a tool for spreading extremist 
propaganda, raising funds and attracting new recruits.”
2
  This usage has 
been instrumental in ISIS’s ability to carry out numerous terrorist attacks 
including the one that took her husband’s life.
3
 
Reynaldo Gonzalez agrees.  His daughter Nohemi was shot and killed 
during a terrorist attack in Paris while dining with friends at a local bistro.
4
  
Nohemi was a student at California State University, Long Beach studying 
in Paris for the semester.
5
  Five other terrorist attacks took place in Paris 
that same night and ISIS claimed responsibility for all of them.
6
  Like Ms. 
Fields, Mr. Gonzalez has sued social media—Twitter, Facebook, and 
YouTube (Google)—arguing that its laissez-faire approach to terrorists on 
its sites caused the death of his daughter.
7
 
Plaintiffs in both cases claim the legal basis for liability lies in United 
States antiterrorism laws, which prohibit providing material support to 
                                                          
1.  Complaint at ¶ 71, Fields v. Twitter, Inc., No. 4:16-CV-00213-KAW (N.D. Cal. filed 
Jan. 13, 2016); Taylor Luck & William Booth, Gunman in Jordan Kills 5, Including 2 Americans, 
at Police Training Site, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/report-2-americans-killed-in-jordan-
shooting-at-security-training-site/2015/11/09/63cdf6f8-86da-11e5-be8b-1ae2e4f50f76_story.html 
[http://perma.cc/SKY7-SQGV].   
 
2.  Complaint, supra note 1, at ¶ 1.  
 
3.  Id.  
 
4.  Verified Complaint at ¶ 111, Gonzalez v. Twitter, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-03282 (N.D. Cal. 
filed June 14, 2016). 
 
5. Id. at ¶ 110.  
 
6.  Id. at ¶¶ 112–13. 
 
7.  Id. at ¶¶ 120–21.   
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known terrorists and offer civil relief to families of victims.
8
  Specifically, 
plaintiffs argue that by knowingly allowing ISIS to use their social 
networks as tools for spreading extremist propaganda, raising funds, and 
attracting new recruits, the defendants violated the Antiterrorism Act 
(“ATA”).
9
 
Ms. Fields’s lawsuit was the first attempt to hold a social media 
company civilly liable under the ATA.
10
  Mr. Gonzalez filed suit five 
months later under the same theory of liability.
11
  These cases likely 
represent the first in a wave of cases against social media platforms 
brought by bereaved families.  It is too early to know whether these claims 
against social media will ultimately be successful, but these suits ring an 
alarm in the social media industry. 
Social media platforms often claim immunity from suits for civil 
liability from harm flowing from content on their platforms under section 
230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”).
12
  This provision 
protects Internet providers from liability for content—posts, pages, 
comments, tweets, etcetera—created by its users.
13
 
These cases represent a new challenge for courts.  The suit brought by 
Ms. Fields was the first attempt to allege liability against social media 
platforms under the antiterrorism laws.  And though significant literature 
                                                          
8.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2001).   
 
9.  Though it probably will not be the last, particularly if Ms. Fields’s suit is successful in 
any measure.  And why not?  There is no point in suing ISIS, Hamas, or other terrorist network 
and there has been an increase in litigation against enterprises that provide material support to 
those organizations.  See Suzanne Northington, Congressional Bill Asks Companies to Disclose 
Boards’ Cybersecurity Expertise, WESTLAW J. COMPUTER & INTERNET, Jan. 2016, at 1 (noting 
that lawyers who specialize in terrorism say that Fields is likely facing an uphill battle). 
 
10.  Marnie O’Neill, Tamara Fields Sues Twitter Over Murder of Husband Lloyd ‘Carl’ 
Fields by IS Operative, NEWS.COM.AU (Jan. 15, 2016, 4:53 
PM), http://www.news.com.au/technology/online/social/tamara-fields-sues-twitter-over-murder-
of-husband-lloyd-carl-fields-by-is-operative/news-story/872169f17161be10a20b4a30de365218 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2016). 
 
11.  See generally Verified Complaint, supra note 4.  
 
12.  47 U.S.C. § 230 (2013) (providing immunity for online publishers for content posted 
by third parties); see infra Section IV. 
 
13.  Id. § 230.  
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has analyzed the broad reach of material support provisions,
14
 there is an 
exceptionally limited amount of scholarship regarding liability for social 
media companies.
15
 
Of note, there is currently no scholarship exploring whether section 
230
16
 might insulate social media companies from liability in cases brought 
under the ATA.
17
  The application of section 230 is unclear where liability 
is based not on the content posted by the third-party, but instead on the 
consequences of allowing that third party to use the social media platform.  
This is a critical distinction and presents a second unsettled question for 
courts confronting these cases. 
This article explores both issues.  Section I examines the likelihood 
that the ATA could result in liability for Twitter and other social media 
companies that provide platforms on which ISIS organizes, raises money, 
and recruits.  Though the discussion is not limited to the set of facts at issue 
in Fields v. Twitter and Gonzalez v. Twitter, these cases are used as a 
framework for analyzing such claims.  Section II evaluates the strength of 
legal arguments social media platforms could make in defense of these 
claims.  However, even assuming social media could obtain defense 
verdicts based on the facts, it does nothing to stop the flow of suits—
plaintiffs will continue to make claims against social media giants 
                                                          
14.  See generally Noah Bialostozky, Material Support of Peace? The On-the-Ground 
Consequences of U.S. and International Material Support of Terrorism Laws and the Need for 
Greater Legal Precision, 36 YALE J. INT’L. L. ONLINE 59 (2011); Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: 
The Government’s War on the Financing of Terrorism and its Implications for Donors, Domestic 
Charitable Organizations, and Global Philanthropy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341 (2004); 
James J. Ward, Note, The Root of All Evil: Expanding Criminal Liability for Providing Material 
Support to Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 471 (2008).  See also David Cole, The New 
McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 10 
(2003). 
 
15.  Only two law journals have published articles somewhat related to this issue.  See 
Emily Goldberg Knox, Note, The Slippery Slope of Material Support Prosecutions: Social Media 
Support to Terrorists, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 295, 308 (2014) (discussing terrorist use of social media 
and material support implications, but not considering section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act as a solution); Paulina Wu, Comment, Impossible to Regulate? Social Media, 
Terrorists, and the Role for the U.N., 16 CHI. J. INT’L L. 281, 283 (2015) (discussing the 
increased use of social media by terrorists and arguing that the United Nations has an important 
role to play in regulating such content, but not examining the material support concerns or 
possible section 230 resolution). 
 
16.  47 U.S.C. § 230 (providing immunity for online publishers for content posted by third 
parties); see infra Section IV. 
 
17.  This conclusion is based on extensive searches resulting in no scholarship.  
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believing in either a strong set of facts that justifies a judgment or hoping 
for a sympathetic judge.  Thus, the litigation costs remain high—each 
company will have to litigate each respective case on the facts.  A better 
solution for social media to have a more favorable outcome would be to 
win on the law—if section 230 applies, case dismissed.  Section III reviews 
the applicability of section 230 of the CDA to the ATA and section IV 
concludes that even though the application of section 230 is imprecise, it 
should shield social media from liability. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND  
 
A. The Attacks 
 
Both Carl Fields, Jr. and Nohemi Gonzalez were shot and killed in 
apparent terrorist attacks in November 2015.  Nohemi, a student at 
California State University, Long Beach studying in Paris for the semester, 
was killed in the Paris attacks while dining with friends at a local bistro.
18
  
Carl was killed while working at the United States-funded Jordan 
International Police Training Centre (“JIPTC”).
19
 
The JIPTC is a facility that trains Palestinian and Iraqi police 
officers.
20
  On November 9, 2015, Anwar Abu Zaid, an officer studying at 
the training center, smuggled an assault rifle with 120 bullets and two 
handguns into the center.
21
  Abu Zaid first shot a truck moving through the 
facility, killing an American.
22
  He then entered the cafeteria and killed 
four additional people who were eating lunch, including Carl.
23
 
Though the Jordanian government explained the attack as a “lone 
wolf” attack inspired by ISIS, ISIS itself claimed responsibility for the 
                                                          
18.  Verified Complaint at ¶¶ 110–11, Gonzalez v. Twitter, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-03282 (N.D. 
Cal. filed June 14, 2016). 
 
19.  See Complaint at ¶¶ 67, 71, Fields v. Twitter, Inc., No. 4:16-CV-00213-KAW (N.D. 
Cal. filed Jan. 13, 2016). 
 
20.  See id. at ¶ 67. 
 
21.  See id. at ¶¶ 69–71. 
 
22.  See id. at ¶ 71. 
 
23.  See id. 
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attack and issued a warning:
24
 “Do not provoke the Muslims more than 
this, especially recruited and supporters of the Islamic State.”
25
  ISIS 
continued: “The more your aggression against the Muslims, the more our 
determination and revenge . . . time will turn thousands of supporters of the 
caliphate on Twitter and others to wolves.”
26
  ISIS supporters commended 
the shooting on Twitter,
27
 which took place on the ten-year anniversary of 
ISIS’s coordinated bomb attacks on three hotels in Amman, Jordan on 
November 9, 2005.
28
  The statement further included a chronological list of 
attack claims that included the November 13th Paris massacre.
29
 
 
B. Social Media and Terror 
 
ISIS’s mention of Twitter in its statement is not surprising.  There is 
little question that ISIS, in addition to several other Designated Foreign 
                                                          
24.  Bridget Johnson, ISIS Claims Lone Wolf Attack in Jordan that Killed Two Americans, 
PJ MEDIA (Nov. 16, 2015), http://pjmedia.com/blog/isis-claims-lone-wolf-attack-in-jordan-that-
killed-two-americans/ [http://perma.cc/Z6DX-AWHE] (The Jordanian government took the 
position that the attack had no link to terrorist groups.  The shooter, Abu Zaid, was killed by 
security forces.); Jonathan Stempel & Alison Frankel, Twitter Sued by U.S. Widow for Giving 
Voice to Islamic State, REUTERS (Jan. 14, 2016, 5:15 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
twitter-isis-lawsuit-idUSKCN0US1TA20160114 [http://perma.cc/AQ86-DNXA]; see also 
Complaint, supra note 19, at ¶ 71 (According to the complaint, ISIS reiterated its responsibility 
for the attacks in its Dabiq Magazine, Issue 12: “And on ‘9 November 2015,’ Anwar Abu 
Zeidafter repenting from his former occupationattacked the American crusaders and their 
apostate allies, killing two American crusaders, two Jordanian apostates, and one South African 
crusader.  These are the deeds of those upon the methodology of the revived Khilāfah.  They will 
not let its enemies enjoy rest until enemy blood is spilled in revenge for the religion and the 
Ummah.”). 
 
25.  Johnson, supra note 24 (also claiming the Russian Metrojet over the Sinai on 
Halloween and the Burj el-Barajneh bombings in the Beirut suburbs on November 12).  
 
26.  Id. 
 
27.  See Complaint, supra note 19, at ¶ 75 (“With one user tweeting: ‘The killing shall 
continue and will not stop.’”). 
 
28.  Taylor Luck & William Booth, Gunman in Jordan Kills 5, Including 2 Americans, at 
Police Training Site, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/report-2-americans-killed-in-jordan-
shooting-at-security-training-site/2015/11/09/63cdf6f8-86da-11e5-be8b-1ae2e4f50f76_story.html 
[http://perma.cc/SKY7-SQGV]. 
 
29.  Johnson, supra note 24. 
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Terrorist Organizations (“DFTOs”), routinely uses Twitter and other social 
media to organize, recruit, fundraise, and inspire violence.
30
  For example, 
there are active Twitter accounts for the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine and Kata’ib Hezbollah, among others.
31
  Terrorists are online: 
they are on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other social media platforms 
to network, data mine, and share information.
32
  Their online presence is 
staggering: “[A]bout 90 percent of organized terrorism on the internet is 
being carried out through social media.”
33
  The reason is simple: social 
media tools are inexpensive, accessible, and allow groups to disseminate 
unfiltered information to a broad audience in real time.
34
 
The increased presence of terrorist organizations on social media has 
generated a growing concern that groups like ISIS are increasingly using 
these communication sites in sophisticated ways.
35
  The fear is that terrorist 
organizations use these sites “to spread their propaganda and training, 
allowing the disaffected worldwide to be radicalized in the privacy of their 
                                                          
30.  See Alan F. Williams, Prosecuting Website Development Under the Material Support 
to Terrorism Statutes: Time to Fix What’s Broken, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 365, 396 
(2008) (“Terrorism experts have reached a consensus that the Internet is a particularly ‘effective 
and important tool of contemporary terrorists.’”); see also Michael Holmes, ISIS Looking For 
Recruits Online, WWLP (June 20, 2014, 11:00 PM), http://wwlp.com/2014/06/20/isis-looking-
for-recruits-online/ [http://perma.cc/2E4Y-25PB] (noting that “supporters of the Jihadist group 
have also launched a public relations offensive online; blitzing sites like Facebook, Twitter and 
Youtube with their extremist message.”).  See generally Gabriel Weimann, New Terrorism and 
New Media, WILSON CENTER: COMMONS LAB 1 (2014), 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/new-terrorism-and-new-media [http://perma.cc/B6MW-
SEPJ]. 
 
31.  See Zoe Bedell & Benjamin Wittes, Tweeting Terrorists, Part I: Don’t Look Now But 
a Lot of Terrorist Groups are Using Twitter, LAWFARE (Feb. 14, 2016, 5:05 PM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/tweeting-terrorists-part-i-dont-look-now-lot-terrorist-groups-are-
using-twitter [http://perma.cc/G2UK-7BWN]. 
 
32.  See Williams, supra note 30, at 396. 
 
33.  Terrorist Groups Recruiting Through Social Media, CBC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2012, 2:24 
PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/terrorist-groups-recruiting-through-social-media-
1.1131053 (last visited Sept. 28, 2016). 
 
34.  See Paulina Wu, Comment, Impossible to Regulate? Social Media, Terrorists, and the 
Role for the U.N., 16 CHI. J. INT’L L. 281, 283 (2015). 
 
35.  Elizabeth Weise, Facebook, Twitter Pressured to do More to Halt Terrorists, USA 
TODAY (Dec. 11, 2015, 6:03 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/12/07/facebook-
twitter-social-media-terrorism-lawmakers-feinstein/76948528/ [http://perma.cc/ZF7L-DFYB]. 
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homes.”
36
  Terrorism expert Rita Katz observed that “[f]or several years, 
ISIS followers have been hijacking Twitter to freely promote their jihad 
with very little to no interference at all . . . . Twitter’s lack of action has 
resulted in a strong, and massive pro-ISIS presence on their social media 
platform, consisting of campaigns to mobilize, recruit and terrorize.”
37
  
According to a report published by J.M. Berger and Heather Perez in 
February 2016 regarding the presence of ISIS on Twitter, there are 
approximately 3,000 ISIS-supporting Twitter accounts active at any given 
time.
38
 
Terrorists have used Facebook to identify sympathizers and 
disseminate bomb-making instructions.
39
  Further, terrorists have used 
Facebook “as a gateway to extremist sites and other online radical content; 
it acts as a media outlet for terrorist propaganda and extremist ideological 
messaging and provides a mechanism to share operational and tactical 
information.”
40
  They use YouTube to share propaganda videos, 
communicate, and recruit.
41
  More recently, “terrorists have used Instagram 
and Flickr to glorify Osama Bin Laden, for example, or document the 
execution of hostages.”
42
 
The United States government is paying attention to the influx of 
terrorist activity on social media sites.  The Obama Administration recently 
held a summit in Silicon Valley to collaborate with technology companies 
                                                          
36.  Id. 
 
37.  Alex Altman, Why Terrorists Love Twitter, TIME (Sept. 11, 2014), 
http://time.com/3319278/isis-isil-twitter/ [http://perma.cc/S9R2-4E4T]. 
 
38.  J.M. Berger & Heather Perez, The Islamic State’s Diminishing Returns on Twitter: 
How Suspensions are Limiting the Social Networks of English-Speaking ISIS Supporters, GW 
PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM 1, 4 (Feb. 2016), 
http://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Berger_Occasional%20Paper.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/B7Q2-UNVW] (noting that Twitter and Facebook are the two main platforms 
used by ISIS supporters to spread their propaganda). 
 
39.  Emily Goldberg Knox, Note, The Slippery Slope of Material Support Prosecutions: 
Social Media Support to Terrorists, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 295, 299–300 (2014). 
 
40.  Wu, supra note 34, at 289. 
 
41.  Knox, supra note 39, at 300. 
 
42.  Wu, supra note 34, at 289. 
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on ways to combat terrorism.
43
  However, the government is not 
necessarily waiting for technology companies to cooperate: legislators have 
introduced legislation that would require technology companies to report 
online terrorist activity to law enforcement.
44
  The recent dispute between 
Apple and the FBI regarding the iPhone belonging to one of the San 
Bernardino shooters provides a clear example of “how far the government 
is willing to push tech companies in the name of fighting terrorism.”
45
 
 
C. The Response to Date 
 
The response of social media companies to terrorists’ use of their 
services is varied
46
 but has been trending towards proactivity in removing 
content posted by terror groups.
47
  Of course, some companies are more 
committed to this than others but there may be a new reason for all social 
media to take a more active position in the fight against terror. 
Initially, social media companies were slow to react to terrorists’ use 
of their sites.
48
  This began to change when social media became the outlet 
                                                          
43.  Jenna McLaughlin, White House Raises Encryption Threat in Silicon Valley Summit, 
INTERCEPT (Jan. 8, 2016, 11:35 AM), http://theintercept.com/2016/01/08/white-house-raises-
encryption-threat-in-silicon-valley-summit/ [http://perma.cc/84XY-EW4M]. 
 
44.  See, e.g., Press Release, Diane Feinstein, U.S. Senator for Cal., Bill Would Require 
Tech Companies to Report Online Terrorist Activity (Dec. 8, 2015) (on file on Diane Feinstein’s 
official website) [http://perma.cc/88SZ-5QEJ] (“We’re in a new age where terrorist groups like 
ISIL are using social media to reinvent how they recruit and plot attacks.”).  After heavy lobbying 
by social media, the bill was withdrawn.  It was recently reintroduced by Senator Feinstein.  See 
Could Twitter Stop the Next Terrorist Attack?, CBS NEWS (July 24, 2015, 10:49 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/could-twitter-stop-the-next-terrorist-attack/ 
[http://perma.cc/T9M9-LX9M]. 
 
45.  Kaveh Waddell, The Government Is Secretly Huddling with Companies to Fight 
Extremism Online, ATLANTIC (Mar. 9, 2016), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/03/the-government-is-secretly-huddling-
with-companies-to-fight-extremism-online/472848/ [http://perma.cc/TN2Q-VRXW]. 
 
46.  Julia Greenberg, Why Facebook and Twitter Can’t Just Wipe Out ISIS Online, WIRED 
(Nov. 21, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/11/facebook-and-twitter-face-tough-
choices-as-isis-exploits-social-media/ [http://perma.cc/6ZV5-QDBL]. 
 
47.  Id. 
 
48.  Helle Dale, Why ISIS Has Threatened the CEOs of Facebook and Twitter, DAILY 
SIGNAL (Feb. 27, 2016), http://dailysignal.com/2016/02/27/why-isis-has-threatened-the-ceos-of-
facebook-and-twitter/ [http://perma.cc/8PS4-6Z7Q]; Greenberg, supra note 46. 
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to spread videos and images of journalist James Foley’s beheading.
49
  
Facebook, for example, began actively policing against terrorists’ use of its 
service: “The world’s largest social network is [now] quicker to remove 
users who back terror groups and investigates posts by their friends.  It has 
assembled a team focused on terrorist content and is helping promote 
‘counter speech,’ or posts that aim to discredit militant groups like [the] 
Islamic State.”
50
  These policing efforts have made a difference: Facebook 
has been more successful than other sites at blocking ISIS-related accounts 
and content.
51
  Still, social media platforms are reluctant to be seen as a 
tool of the government. 
Twitter has taken a different approach from Facebook and does not 
monitor or actively police content.  Though the company has recently 
“condemn[ed] the use of [its services] to promote terrorism,”
52
 Twitter has 
“maintained one of the most liberal free speech policies among major 
social networks,”
53
 thereby positioning itself as a defender of free speech.
54
  
In a January 2011 blog post entitled “The Tweets Must Flow,” Twitter co-
                                                          
 
49.  Greenberg, supra note 46. 
 
50.  Natalie Andrews & Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook Steps Up Efforts Against 
Terrorism, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2016, 7:39 PM),  
http://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-steps-up-efforts-against-terrorism-1455237595 (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2016). 
 
51.  Brian Mastroianni, Could Policing Social Media Help Prevent Terrorist Attacks?, 
CBS NEWS (Dec. 15, 2015, 7:15 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/could-policing-social-
media-prevent-terrorist-attacks/ [http://perma.cc/N8DB-5YYY]. 
 
52.  Twitter, Combating Violent Extremism, TWITTER BLOG (Feb. 5, 2016, 8:13 PM), 
http://blog.twitter.com/2016/combating-violent-extremism [http://[perma..cc/LS83-AQNP]. 
 
53.  Jessi Hempel, Twitter’s Latest Challenge: Deciding Who’s a Terrorist, WIRED (Jan. 
8, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2016/01/twitters-latest-challenge-is-deciding-whos-a-
terrorist/ [http://perma.cc/HFX9-JRPZ]. 
 
54.  See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 30 (noting that Twitter founder Biz Stone—who is no 
longer with the company— responded to media questions about ISIS’s use of Twitter to publicize 
its acts of terrorism by saying: “[i]f you want to create a platform that allows for the freedom of 
expression for hundreds of millions of people around the world, you really have to take the good 
with the bad.”); Deana Kjuka, When Terrorists Take to Social Media, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 20, 
2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/02/when-terrorists-take-to-social-
media/273321 [http://perma.cc/9TZN-N835]; Somini Sengupta, Twitter’s Free Speech Defender, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/03/technology/twitter-chief-
lawyer-alexander-macgillivray-defender-free-speech.html.  
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founder Biz Stone and Twitter General Counsel Alex MacGillivray wrote: 
“We don’t always agree with the things people choose to tweet, but we 
keep the information flowing irrespective of any view we may have about 
the content.”
55
  In its defender role, Twitter denied every removal request 
(126 in total) made by the United States Government in 2015.
56
  Twitter 
has thus demonstrated a concern for protecting speech even in the face of a 
countervailing government interest. 
The tension between Twitter’s hands-off approach to content 
regulation and terrorist organizations’ embrace of social media came to a 
head this year when Tamara Fields and Reynaldo Gonzalez sued social 
media for the deaths of their loved ones.  In both cases, plaintiffs claimed 
that social media knowingly permitted ISIS to use their social networks as 
tools for spreading extremist propaganda, raising funds and attracting new 
recruits in violation of the ATA.
57
  The ATA prohibits providing material 
support to terrorist organizations and offers a civil claim for relief to 
victims.
58
 
Although it is too early to know whether these claims against social 
media will ultimately be successful,
59
 these suits should raise the hackles of 
                                                          
55.  Biz Stone, The Tweets Must Flow, TWITTER BLOG (Jan. 28, 2011, 8:13 PM), 
http://blog.twitter.com/2011/the-tweets-must-flow [http://perma.cc/7254-6NSQ] (While this post 
was written in the wake of the Egyptian Revolution in January 2011 and was not aimed at ISIS’s 
presence on the platform, Twitter has largely remained steadfast in its dedication to free-flowing 
speech on the website). 
 
56.  Removal Requests-January to June 2015, TWITTER TRANSPARENCY REPORT, 
http://transparency.twitter.com/removal-requests/2015/jan-jun [http://perma.cc/6N7Q-8CQ6]; 
Removal Requests-July to December 2015, TWITTER TRANSPARENCY REPORT, 
http://transparency.twitter.com/en/removal-requests.html#removal-requests-jul-dec-2015 
[http://perma.cc/2GGR-ZP3H].  This includes requests made by a government agency, police, 
and other authorized reporters. 
 
57.  Though it probably will not be the last, particularly if Ms. Fields’s suit is successful in 
any measure.  And why not?  There is no point in suing ISIS, Hamas, or any other terrorist 
network and there has been an increase in litigation against enterprises that provide material 
support to those organizations.  See Suzanne Northington, Congressional Bill Asks Companies to 
Disclose Boards’ Cybersecurity Expertise, WESTLAW J. COMPUTER & INTERNET, Jan. 2016, at 
14 (noting that lawyers who specialize in terrorism say that Fields is likely facing an uphill 
battle). 
 
58.  18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2001). 
 
59.  Though based on the facts of these cases, to be discussed in Sections I–III, infra, I 
suspect this is doubtful. 
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social media companies worldwide.  The theory of causation is 
exceptionally broad.  A finding in favor of the plaintiffs would, at 
minimum, force social media to actively monitor and police any account it 
suspected as having a link to a DFTO, but could also require much more.  
The repercussions would not stop with Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube 
(Google).  All companies offering web-based services would certainly have 
reason to worry, as would websites that offer even attenuated support or 
services that are generally available to the public.  The impact would be 
far-reaching and potentially crippling for many organizations.  Further, 
many organizations likely would become increasingly involved with 
content regulation, consequently impacting the ability of the billions who 
use social media to communicate as openly and without as little oversight 
as they do now. 
Importantly, the United States government has expressed a preference 
for enhanced security over speech when it comes to terrorism.
60
  Preventing 
terrorism is a priority and the government has already prosecuted several 
founders and administrators of websites with known links to terrorism 
under the ATA and has been vocal about the need to deprive terrorists of 
these tools.
61
  In addition, the government has emphasized the need to 
frustrate DFTOs’ efforts to exploit social media to further their terrorist 
agenda, specifically calling on Twitter— often without success—to shut 
down particular accounts linked to known terrorists.
62
  The ATA offers 
victims of terrorism a civilly-based means of redress for the exact same 
grievances—providing support to terrorists—regardless of whether the 
government has prosecuted the conduct or not.  A closer look at the statute 
                                                          
60.  See McLaughlin, supra note 43. 
 
61.  Knox, supra note 39, at 308; Williams, supra note 30, at 400 (“The Internet is a 
critical tool for modern terrorist organizations, and the U.S. government, like those of other 
countries, has a substantial interest in regulating advocacy on this medium that is specifically 
intended to encourage violent attacks on the United States and its citizensparticularly messages 
targeted to assist in the recruitment of a new crop of terrorists and efforts designed to raise funds 
for terrorist organizations.”); see also Hillary Clinton, My Plan to Defeat ISIS, MEDIUM (Dec. 7, 
2015), http://medium.com/hillary-for-america/my-plan-to-defeat-isis-769a7f485ace#.a3y2fr8ax 
[http://perma.cc/FT3F-KZBA]; Liz Kreutz, Hillary Clinton Calls on Facebook, YouTube, and 
Twitter to Help With Fight Against ISIS, ABC NEWS (Dec. 6, 2015, 11:47 AM), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/hillary-clinton-calls-facebook-youtube-twitter-fight-
isis/story?id=35607324 (last visited Sept. 28, 2016). 
 
62.  Michael Isikoff, Twitter Under Pressure to Act More Aggressively Against Terrorists, 
YAHOO! NEWS (Feb. 18, 2015), http://news.yahoo.com/twitter-under-pressure-to-act-more-
aggressively-against-terrorists-230347109.html [http://perma.cc/9MH2-TCFG]. 
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and recent case law suggests that an unfavorable outcome for social media 
is certainly plausible.
63
 
 
III. COULD THE MATERIAL SUPPORT LAWS RESULT IN LIABILITY FOR 
SOCIAL MEDIA? 
 
Social media makes it possible for people around the world to 
disseminate information to wide audiences and stay connected with others 
at a low cost.  Its utility reaches traditional news media organizations, 
celebrities, athletes, corporations, private citizens, and everyone in 
between, including terrorists.  Of course, ISIS and other terrorist 
organizations use social media not because the platforms were made for or 
offered exclusively to them, but rather because the services are available to 
everyone. 
Twitter, for example, boasts hundreds of millions of users.
64
  
Worldwide, users post over 500 million tweets per day.
65
  That is 6,000 
tweets per second.  Given this volume, it may seem far-fetched that without 
endorsing or promoting a terrorist organization’s tweets, Twitter could face 
liability. 
But the ATA does not premise liability merely on whether it is 
Twitter’s purpose to further the goals of the terrorist organization.  Instead, 
the statute only requires a showing that Twitter had knowledge or exhibited 
deliberate indifference in providing material support to a terrorist 
                                                          
63.  Professor David Cole has described that the material support statute is written so 
broadly that it penalizes anything a defendant has done that benefits a group that has been 
identified by the government as a DFTO.  David Cole, Address to the Terrorism & Justice 
Conference: Less Safe, Less Free: A Progress Report on the War on Terror (Feb. 18, 2008), in J. 
INST. JUST. & INT’L STUD., 1, 6 (“This law basically allows the government to get a so-called 
“terrorism conviction” without proving that the defendant, engaged in any terrorist act, conspired 
to engage in any terrorist act, aided or abetted any terrorist act, or ever intended to further any 
kind of terrorism.”); see also  David Cole, Is Hamas’s Twitter Account Illegal?, DAILY BEAST 
(Nov. 20, 2012, 9:30 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/11/20/is-hamas-s-twitter-
account-illegal.html [http://perma.cc/JJ7Z-BNER] (“[T]he ‘material support’ law is written so 
broadly that it makes virtually anything one does to or for a designated group a crime, even if it 
has no link to terrorist activity of any kind.”). 
 
64.  Complaint at ¶ 60, Fields v. Twitter, Inc., No. 4:16-CV-00213-KAW (N.D. Cal. filed 
Jan. 13, 2016). 
 
65.  Twitter Usage Statistics, INTERNET LIVE STATS, 
http://www.Internetlivestats.com/twitter-statistics/#trend [http://perma.cc/PJS7-DDPF]. 
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organization.
66
  As Professor Cole explains, “[t]he material support law is a 
classic instance of guilt by association.  It imposes liability regardless of an 
individual’s own intentions or purposes, based solely on the individual’s 
connection to others who have committed illegal acts.”
67
  It should come as 
no surprise then that this is exactly what the complaints in the current cases 
allege: that Twitter and other social media were insufficiently attentive to 
the abuse of their platforms by terrorist organizations such as ISIS.
68
 
Accordingly, the operative legal question is not whether social media 
offers a service directly or exclusively to terrorist organizations, but rather 
whether those companies are aggressive enough in their response to 
addressing the use of their services by people and organizations they know 
to be terrorists.  In short, the defendants could face liability if they 
knowingly provided a platform on which terrorists could recruit, raise 
funds, and/or mobilize. 
This broad exposure to liability is precisely what Congress intended: 
the legislation aimed to reach those that made it possible for terrorist 
organizations to carry out attacks.
69
  Thus, the material support provision 
covers a significant amount of otherwise harmless conduct.
70
  The 
legislative history indicates that “the crux of the ATA was to provide 
plaintiffs with certainty that a valid right of action against terrorist acts 
would be available to vindicate their injuries.”
71
  The material support 
provisions thus specifically target those who have assisted terrorist 
                                                          
66.  18 U.S.C. § 2339 (2012); Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 768 F.3d 202, 208 
(2d Cir. 2014). 
 
67.  David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 10 (2003). 
 
68.  See Verified Complaint at ¶¶ 110–11, Gonzalez v. Twitter, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-03282 
(N.D. Cal. filed June 14, 2016); Complaint, supra note 64, at ¶¶ 69–71. 
 
69.  H.R. REP. NO. 102-1040, at 5 (1992); Peter Budoff, Note, How Far Is Too Far? The 
Proper Framework for Civil Remedies Against Facilitators of Terrorism, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 
1057, 1082 (2015). 
 
70.  See Cole, supra note 67, at 13 (noting that “the material support law presumes that 
even a donation of crayons to a day-care center affiliated with Hamas will ‘facilitate’ terrorism”). 
 
71.  H.R. REP. NO. 102-1040, at 5; Jesse D. H. Snyder, Note, Reading Between the Lines: 
Statutory Silence and Congressional Intent Under the Antiterrorism Act, 1 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL 
STUD. 265, 269 (2012).  
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organizations in certain specific ways.
72
  “The concern is . . . that if people 
are allowed to speak, associate, and support [terrorist] organizations freely, 
those organizations might be strengthened, and might take dangerous 
action in the future.”
73
 
Thus, Congress recognized that the ATA needed to be broad to 
further the policy goals of assigning liability to financial supporters of 
terrorism.
74
  Despite this clear intent, courts have struggled to reconcile the 
ATA with traditional tort law principles that warn against imposing strict 
liability on those without strong and obvious connections to terrorism.
75
  
The result of this struggle is that it is uncertain whether claims under the 
ATA against social media companies are viable. 
 
A. Civil liability Under the ATA 
 
When initially enacted in 1986, the ATA was meant to provide an 
avenue for victims of international terrorism to bring claims in United 
States courts against those who perpetrated the attack.
76
  Under the current 
civil remedies provision, liability expands beyond terrorist organizations, 
many of which are jurisdictionally out of reach.
77
  The current version 
                                                          
72.  Snyder, supra note 71, at 271. 
 
73.  David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and 
War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 724 (2009) (noting that the problem “is that while some people tried 
and convicted for “material support” may pose a real threat to the nation’s security, the laws’ 
overbreadth means that many who do not pose such a threat may nonetheless fall within their 
proscriptions.  In this sense, they are inaccurate proxies for actual dangerousness, and, as 
preventive measures, are vastly overinclusive.”). 
 
74.  Id. 
 
75.  Abecassis v. Wyatt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 623, 664 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
 
76.  See Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (explaining 
that the legislation was in many ways a response to two terrorist attacks—the attack by the PLO 
of the Achille Lauro cruiseliner and the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland 
by Libyan terrorists). 
 
77.  18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (1994); H.R. REP. NO. 102-1040, at 5; Geoffrey Sant, So Banks 
Are Terrorists Now?: The Misuse of the Civil Suit Provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 45 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 533, 534 (2013) (noting that this change was made because few terrorists maintain assets 
in the United States and as such, “not a single reported decision so much as referenced the ATA’s 
civil suit provision during its first decade in existence”). 
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offers victims
78
 of international terrorism a remedy to sue for civil damages 
against not only the terrorist organizations but also those who provide them 
with material support.
79
  Under the present statute, United States nationals 
who have been injured as a result of illegal
80
 and violent acts abroad may 
pursue these claims in United States courts.
81
 
Claims against social media companies based on violations of 
material support under the ATA are likely to be predicated on violations of 
sections 2339A and 2339B, both of which prohibit providing material 
support to terrorists and terrorist organizations.
82
  Thus, a claimant would 
argue that he or she is entitled to civil damages based on the social media 
company’s provision of services to terrorists, which is a violation of 
section 2339A and 2339B. 
Indeed, both Ms. Fields and Mr. Gonzalez have predicated their 
entitlement to a civil remedy under section 2333 on violations of sections 
2339A and 2339B of the ATA.
83
  The arguments are that the defendant 
social media companies knew or reasonably should have known that ISIS 
used their services.
84
  And because ISIS used those services to spread 
extremist propaganda, raise money, and attract recruits; the defendants’ 
provision of that platform satisfied the definition of material support.
85
 
Despite the fact that the statute itself is silent on what a plaintiff needs 
                                                          
78
.  
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (Under the statute, the survivor may sue as well has his or her 
estate, survivors, or heirs). 
 
79.  Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 768 F.3d 202, 206–07 (2d Cir. 2014); Gill, 
893 F. Supp. 2d at 492. 
 
80.  Under section 2331, international terrorism is defined to include “violent acts or acts 
dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any 
State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United 
States or of any State.”  18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2012). 
 
81.  Id. 
 
82.  18 U.S.C. § 2339 (2012). 
 
83.  Complaint, supra note 64, at ¶¶ 79–86 (alleging that Twitter purposefully, knowingly, 
or with willful blindness provided to ISIS support and services which constitute material support 
to a Foreign Terrorist Organization). 
 
84.  Complaint, supra note 64, at ¶ 80; Verified Complaint, supra note 68, at ¶ 9. 
 
85.  Complaint, supra note 64, at ¶ 1. 
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to prove to succeed on a claim under section 2333,
86
 courts have generally 
required three factors: (1) an unlawful action—here, the provision of 
material support; (2) the requisite mental state; and (3) causation.
87
 
 
1. What counts as material support? 
 
Establishing the provision of material support is the lowest hurdle 
when it comes to claims against social media and other web-service 
providers.  It is immaterial that the platforms (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, 
YouTube) are not themselves illegal.
88
  Material support is broadly 
defined
89
—it includes both communications equipment and other tangible 
and intangible property and services: 
 
[T]he term “material support or resources” means any property, 
tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary 
instruments, or financial securities, financial services, lodging, 
training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false 
documentation or identification, communications equipment, 
facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or 
more individuals who may be or include oneself), and 
transportation, except medicine or religious materials.
90
 
 
                                                          
86.  Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 55 (D.D.C. 2010) (explaining 
that Congress did not explicitly set out the elements that a private plaintiff would be required to 
plead and prove to recover.  Instead, it “intended to incorporate general principles of tort law . . . 
into the [civil] cause of action under the ATA.”) (emphasis added); see also S. REP. NO. 102-342, 
at 45 (1992) (“This section creates the right of action, allowing any U.S. national who has been 
injured in his person, property, or business by an act of international terrorism to bring an 
appropriate action in a U.S. district court.  The substance of such an action is not defined by the 
statute, because the fact patterns giving rise to such suits will be as varied and numerous as those 
found in the law of torts.  This bill opens the courthouse door to victims of international 
terrorism.”) (emphasis added). 
 
87.  Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 502 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 
88.  See David Cole, Is Hamas’s Twitter Account Illegal?, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 20, 2012, 
9:30 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/11/20/is-hamas-s-twitter-account-
illegal.html [http://perma.cc/JJ7Z-BNER]. 
 
89.  See id. 
 
90.  18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2012). 
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A service that offers individuals and organizations the ability to 
network and communicate fits neatly into the above definition.  Twitter 
offers a service that allows users to send and read short 140 character 
messages called tweets, join back-channels, and link to outside content.
91
  
Facebook offers an interactive service that allows users to create profiles; 
post commentary, links, images, and videos; and interact with other users 
both via private messages and public posts on other users’ “walls.”
92
  
YouTube offers a service that allows users to upload and comment on 
videos.
93
 
Consequently, the material support element should be easy for any 
plaintiff seeking to use the material support provisions in this way, such as 
Ms. Fields and Mr. Gonzalez. 
In fact, the government has already prosecuted founders and 
administrators of websites with known links to terrorism under the material 
support statute.
94
  The Department of Justice has gone further “suggest[ing] 
that website administrators would be held criminally liable for terrorist 
activity on their websites.”
95
  Thus, there is little question that the services 
provided by social media constitute material support as defined in the 
statute. 
 
2. The knowledge requirement. 
 
The Supreme Court has construed the definition of material support 
                                                          
91.  See generally TWITTER, www.twitter.com [http://perma.cc/2BTK-ND62]. 
 
92.  See generally FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com [http://perma.cc/BMY8-ZAUX]. 
 
93.  See generally YOUTUBE, http://www.YouTube.com [http://perma.cc/2SS7-XWUH]. 
 
94.  Emily Goldberg Knox, Note, The Slippery Slope of Material Support Prosecutions: 
Social Media Support to Terrorists, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 295, 308–09 (2014) (giving examples, 
including that “in 2010, the DOJ charged Zachary Chesser, the founder of a radical website, with 
attempting to provide material support to a designated FTO”); Mattathias Schwartz, How 
Dangerous Were the Edmonds Cousins?, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 31, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-dangerous-were-the-edmonds-cousins 
[http://perma.cc/C57V-ZPHP]; David Smith, 81% of ISIS-Linked Suspects Charged in US are 
American Citizens, GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2015, 9:07 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/20/isis-suspects-us-citizens-syria 
[http://perma.cc/TCW3-JG2H]. 
 
95.  Knox, supra note 94, at 308. 
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broadly.
96
  In so doing, the Court made clear that the critical question in 
any given case will be whether knowingly allowing terrorists to use the 
service can be viewed as material support.
97
  Here, the relevant inquiry is 
how much knowledge social media companies would need to have about 
terrorists’ activities on their platforms to satisfy the mens rea requirement. 
Section 2333 of the ATA, which offers the civil remedy to victims, 
does not include a mens rea requirement on its face.
98
  Instead, courts have 
incorporated one from the relevant statutory provisions—here, section 
2339A and section 2339B(a)(1).
99
  Section 2339A criminalizes the 
provision of material support to terrorists if the defendant knew that the 
support would be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, violations of 
certain criminal laws, or if the defendant intended the support to be so 
used.
100
  This section presents an immediate—and likely insurmountable—
hurdle for many plaintiffs challenging social media, including Ms. Fields 
and probably Mr. Gonzalez, as it requires a higher degree of knowledge or 
intent that the support or resources are used in executing violent federal 
crimes.
101
 
                                                          
96.  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2010). 
 
97.  See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim II), 549 F.3d 685, 690 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (en banc majority opinion) (The case discussed the parents of a United States national 
who was fatally shot in Israel by terrorists and sued several parties, including a charity that 
provided humanitarian support to Hamas.  The Seventh Circuit held that even though giving 
money is not a violent act, “[g]iving money to Hamas, like giving a loaded gun to a child (which 
also is not a violent act), is an ‘act dangerous to human life.’”). 
 
98.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (“(a) Action and jurisdiction.  –Any national of the United 
States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international 
terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district 
court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost 
of the suit, including attorney's fees; (b) Estoppel under United States law.  –A final judgment or 
decree rendered in favor of the United States in any criminal proceeding under section 1116, 
1201, 1203, or 2332 of this title or section 46314, 46502, 46505, or 46506 of title 49 shall estop 
the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent 
civil proceeding under this section; (c) Estoppel under foreign law.  –A final judgment or decree 
rendered in favor of any foreign state in any criminal proceeding shall, to the extent that such 
judgment or decree may be accorded full faith and credit under the law of the United States, estop 
the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent 
civil proceeding under this section.”). 
 
99.  See Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 504 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 
100.  18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012). 
 
101.  Id.; Knox, supra note 94, at 308 (noting that “[w]ithout direct evidence, it would be 
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Section 2339B is broader and requires only knowledge that material 
support or resources are being provided, not that they are being used for 
terrorism.
102
  Accordingly, section 2339B offers plaintiffs asserting claims 
against social media the best chance for recovery.
103
  It requires only that 
the defendant knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired to 
provide material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.
104
  
Thus, defendants do not need to know that their support is furthering 
terrorism or illegal activities: “knowledge about the organization’s 
connection to terrorism” is enough.
105
  Courts have held that an 
organization’s “knowing provision of material support” to a terrorist 
organization (or its deliberate indifference as to whether or not it provided 
material support to a terrorist organization) qualifies as sufficient 
knowledge to hold it accountable.
106
  Simply put, this is not a high 
standard. 
For example, in a case against Twitter based on an attack carried out 
by ISIS, for Twitter to demonstrate it lacked knowledge, it would have to 
show that it legitimately did not know, and could not find out, whether ISIS 
ran various accounts.  On the other hand, Twitter would have acted with 
                                                          
far-fetched to assert that legitimate businesses, such as social media companies, act intending to 
promote federal terrorism crimes”). 
 
102.  18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012). 
 
103.  Id. (As noted above, the statute requires knowledge or intent that the material 
support is being used for terrorism and therefore is a less viable option as applied here.). 
 
104.  Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 504. 
 
105.  See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2010) (holding that 
“Congress plainly spoke to the necessary mental state for a violation § 2339B, and it chose 
knowledge about the organization’s connection to terrorism, not specific intent to further the 
organization’s terrorist activities”); see also Knox, supra note 94, at 308 (“As mentioned above, § 
2339A is not a viable option as applied to the activities of social media companies because of the 
specific intent requirement.  Section 2339B, however, which requires only ‘knowledge about the 
organization’s connection to terrorism,’ could conceivably be applied to social media websites 
used by designated FTOs who claim on their account profile to be acting on behalf of such an 
organization.”). 
 
106.  Boim II, 549 F.3d at 698 (“To give money to an organization that commits terrorist 
acts is not intentional misconduct unless one either knows that the organization engages in such 
acts or is deliberately indifferent to whether it does or not, meaning that one knows there is a 
substantial probability that the organization engages in terrorism but one does not care.”); Linde 
v. Arab Bank, PLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287, 331 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
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the requisite mental state if it knew that ISIS operated certain accounts to 
further the terrorist group’s goals and did nothing to stop the accounts.
107
  
To avoid a finding of knowledge under the statute, Twitter would have to 
remove all accounts it knew to be affiliated with ISIS.  Twitter could not 
avoid knowledge by arguing that it offers a communications platform 
ubiquitously available to anyone and that the platform was not specifically 
aimed at terrorists. 
This reading of the mens rea requirement would not be problematic 
for Twitter if it could simply argue that it does not know who runs a 
particular account.  However, Twitter cannot be deliberately indifferent as 
to whether ISIS operates certain accounts.
108
 
This, of course, is where things get complicated.  Twitter, along with 
Facebook and Google, knows that ISIS and other terrorist organizations use 
their platforms.  United States government officials have identified these 
sites as crucial communication tools used by ISIS.
109
  Commentators and 
activists have acknowledged the problem.
110
  Indeed, Twitter itself has 
acknowledged it: in a public statement posted after the Fields’ suit was 
filed, Twitter claims to have suspended over 125,000 accounts for 
threatening or promoting terrorist acts, primarily those related to ISIS.
111
  
Notably, online anti-terror activists, including the group Anonymous, have 
disputed Twitter’s assertions, claiming that Anonymous is actually 
responsible for the majority of the account suspensions.
112
 
                                                          
107.  Linde, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 331. 
 
108.  Boim II, 549 F.3d at 693; Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 506. 
 
109.  See discussion supra Section II, pp. 9–10. 
 
110.  See, e.g., Alan F. Williams, Prosecuting Website Development Under the Material 
Support to Terrorism Statutes: Time to Fix What’s Broken, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
365, 396 (2008); Paulina Wu, Comment, Impossible to Regulate? Social Media, Terrorists, and 
the Role for the U.N., 16 CHI. J. INT’L L. 281, 283 (2015). 
 
111.  Twitter, Combating Violent Extremism, TWITTER BLOG (Feb. 5, 2016, 8:13 PM), 
http://blog.twitter.com/2016/combating-violent-extremism [http://perma.cc/LS83-AQNP]. 
 
112.  Joshua Philipp, Hackers Say Twitter Isn’t Telling the Whole Story About Anti-Terror 
Fight, EPOCH TIMES (Mar. 4, 2016, 10:54 PM), http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1983519-
hackers-say-twitter-isnt-telling-the-whole-story-about-anti-terror-fight/ [http://perma.cc/5826-
XQ6A]; Complaint, supra note 64, at ¶ 61 (This is because Twitter does not independently search 
for problematic accounts but instead relies on user reports.  These activists further claim that 
Twitter has actually been suspending accounts of the users reporting online terrorism as well: 
“Members of the community have taken this as a slap in the face.  While Twitter is telling the 
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Putting aside for the moment who is responsible for the account 
suspensions, it must be noted that these takedowns reduce the “amount of 
pro-ISIS content available on Twitter . . . .”  As accounts are shut down, 
followers are lost and “individual users who repeatedly created new 
accounts after being suspended [suffer] devastating reductions in their 
follower counts.”
113
  ISIS then responds with countermeasures, such as 
using applications and “simple hacking techniques to quickly create new 
accounts for users who have been suspended, as well as elaborate tactics to 
rebuild follower networks.”
114
  As this game of whack-a-mole plays out, 
“more than 20,000 Twitter accounts supporting ISIS across multiple 
languages” are still live.
115
  And the operative question becomes: are 
Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, or any other social media company sitting at 
the defendants’ table doing enough? 
At its core, any ATA claim against social media is premised on a 
claim that the site knowingly let ISIS exploit its services because it was not 
attentive enough to the problem; in short, it was deliberately indifferent.  In 
her case, Ms. Fields alleges that Twitter knew of the rampant use of its 
platform by ISIS (such use was widely reported by news organizations, for 
example) and that it did not do enough to stop it.
116
  This argument is 
bolstered by the fact that Twitter does not actively police its site for content 
violations.
117
  Instead, Twitter relies on users reporting violations.
118
  
                                                          
public it’s working to stop ISIS recruitment on its services, it has been suspending accounts of the 
community that is doing the actual footwork.”); P.W. Singer & Emerson Brooking, Terror on 
Twitter, POPULAR SCIENCE (Dec. 11, 2015), http://www.popsci.com/terror-on-twitter-how-isis-is-
taking-war-to-social-media [http://perma.cc/7YGH-FHRG] (Where it is explained that while 
Twitter has provided a passive stance and will remove accounts that are reported as terrorists, 
hacktivist groups such as Anonymous have launched active attacks and “hunting” initiatives to 
find and take down terror accounts on Twitter.). 
 
113.  J.M. Berger & Heather Perez, The Islamic State’s Diminishing Returns on Twitter: 
How Suspensions are Limiting the Social Networks of English-Speaking ISIS Supporters, GW 
PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM 1, 4 (Feb. 2016), 
http://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Berger_Occasional%20Paper.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/B7Q2-UNVW]. 
 
114.  Berger & Perez, supra note 113, at 4.  
 
115.  Ians, The Reach of ISIS Dwindling on Twitter, TECHRADAR INDIA (Feb. 22, 2016, 
3:34 PM), http://www.in.techradar.com/news/internet/The-reach-of-ISISdwindling-on-
Twitter/articleshow/51090888.cms [http://perma.cc/5ZD9-K8CS]. 
 
116.  Complaint, supra note 64, at ¶ 43. 
 
117.  Yoree Koh, Lawsuit Blames Twitter for ISIS Terrorist Attack, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 14, 
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Additionally, Twitter has consistently rebuffed requests from the United 
States government and other governments to remove suspected terrorist 
accounts.
119
  Under the current reading of the statute, if Twitter took the 
position, whether because of its self-proclaimed position as a steward of 
free speech or otherwise, that it would not remove accounts identified by 
the United States government as DFTOs, this “deliberate indifference”
120
 
would likely satisfy the mens rea requirement.
121
  For example, if the 
government identifies an account suspected to be run by ISIS and Twitter 
elects to keep the account open (as it has done in the past), it is openly 
providing material support to a group the government has just identified as 
a DFTO.  Less clear is whether Twitter’s policy of responding to reports 
instead of proactively monitoring its site for terrorist users satisfies the 
mens rea requirement on its own.
122
 
In cases where the government has not done the work of identifying 
the accounts run by a DFTO—which is likely to be the majority of the 
time—the social media company is catapulted into the precarious position 
of defending whatever steps it has taken to identify and combat the use of 
its platform by terrorists as enough.
123
  Worse, it potentially puts these 
                                                          
2016, 5:11 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2016/01/14/lawsuit-blames-twitter-for-isis-terrorist-
attack/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2016) (stating that Twitter does not actively police content except 
for images of child-sexual exploitation); ‘Twitter Does Not Pro-actively Alert Authorities to 
Terrorist Content’, ASIAN IMAGE (Feb. 2, 2016), 
http://www.asianimage.co.uk/news/14248369._Twitter_does_not_pro_actively_alert_authorities_
to_terrorist_content_/ [http://perma.cc/YT7V-K6M9] (Twitter’s UK public policy manager, Nick 
Pickles, is quoted as saying that the microblogging platform does not actively notify law 
enforcement for terrorist material found by staff or users). 
 
118.  Koh, supra note 117. 
 
119.  See generally Complaint, supra note 64, at ¶¶ 69–71. 
 
120.  Boim II, 549 F.3d at 692–93. 
 
121.  See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 768 (2011) (The 
Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of willful blindness in a civil case for induced patent 
infringement.  For the eight-justice majority, Justice Alito wrote: “Given the long history of 
willful blindness and its wide acceptance in the Federal Judiciary, we can see no reason why the 
doctrine should not apply in civil lawsuits . . . .”).  
 
122.  Does waiting for third-parties to report abuse count as deliberate indifference?  
Another unanswered question. 
 
123.  Whether its efforts are enough is not likely to be decided on a Rule 12 motion. 
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companies in the position of determining who terrorists are and which 
accounts they own, something that is increasingly challenging given 
complaints from a global range based on different definitions of terrorism. 
Additionally, most social media companies have terms of service 
and/or community guidelines that users must agree to in order to use the 
services.
124
  These rules generally prohibit threatening speech, bullying, 
illegal conduct, and similar conduct.
125
  Twitter’s rules, for example, 
prohibit terrorist-driven content.
126
  Facebook claims that any profile, page, 
or group related to a terrorist organization will be shut down and any 
content celebrating terrorism immediately removed.
127
 
Any social media company with such a policy could argue that it has 
taken a stand against terrorists using its platform by virtue of its policy.  
But importantly, the company retains the exclusive right to decide how to 
enforce its rules, if at all.
128
  In Twitter’s case, where it prohibits terrorist-
driven content, it alone has the power to define what “promoting terrorism” 
actually means.
129
  However, simply posting a set of rules “banning” 
terrorists from exploiting their sites where there is little or no follow-up 
                                                          
124.  See, e.g., Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK (Jan. 30, 2015), 
http://www.facebook.com/terms [http://perma.cc/B28X-WS24]. 
 
125.  See, e.g., Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 124 (“You will not 
post content that: is hate speech, threatening, or pornographic; incites violence; or contains nudity 
or graphic or gratuitous violence.”); The Twitter Rules, TWITTER (2016), 
http://support.twitter.com/articles/18311# [http://perma.cc/VQ5Y-X7ZD] (“You may not make 
threats of violence or promote violence, including threatening or promoting terrorism.”). 
 
126.  See The Twitter Rules, supra note 125 (“Violent threats (direct or indirect): You may 
not make threats of violence or promote violence, including threatening or promoting terrorism,” 
“Hateful conduct: You may not promote violence against or directly attack or threaten other people 
on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, religious 
affiliation, age, disability, or disease.  We also do not allow accounts whose primary purpose is 
inciting harm towards others on the basis of these categories.”) (emphasis added). 
 
127.  Julia Greenberg, Why Facebook and Twitter Can’t Just Wipe Out ISIS Online, 
WIRED (Nov. 21, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/11/facebook-and-twitter-face-
tough-choices-as-isis-exploits-social-media/ [http://perma.cc/6ZV5-QDBL]. 
 
128.  Twitter Terms of Service (If You Live in the United 
States), TWITTER, http://twitter.com/tos?lang=en [http://perma.cc/AY4H-ZKFT]. 
 
129.  The complaint against Twitter by Ms. Fields thus smartly asserts that Twitter 
enforced its rules only after it was notified of their violation and that it did not take enough of a 
proactive role in discovering abuses—and potentially defining certain uses as abuses.  Complaint, 
supra note 64, at 10–11. 
 
ELR – BROWN (V4) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2017  5:09 PM 
2016] FIGHT TERROR, NOT TWITTER 25 
 
regarding compliance is not enough to disclaim knowledge under the ATA. 
Exactly how diligent social media has to be to escape knowledge is 
not clear.  As one commentator asked: “Does a tweet promote terrorism if 
it comes from an account kept by known terrorists?  What constitutes a 
threatening tweet?  And perhaps most important, how does Twitter decide 
who is a terrorist?  Does Twitter have the sophistication necessary to make 
these judgments across the world amid constantly shifting cultural norms 
and complex political upheavals?”
130
  Is taking down 125,000 accounts 
evidence that Twitter
131
 is policing sufficiently?  What if Twitter knew or, 
even murkier, suspected of 300,000 accounts?  1,000,000?  Establishing 
the threshold of what is “enough” is a fact-driven question that could too 
easily leave Twitter on the wrong side of the line. 
After Ms. Fields filed suit, Twitter claimed in a blog post that it 
would aggressively address terrorists’ exploitation of its platform.  “We 
have increased the size of the teams that review reports, reducing our 
response time significantly.  We also look into other accounts similar to 
those reported and leverage proprietary spam-fighting tools to surface other 
potentially violating accounts for review by our agents.  We have already 
seen results, including an increase in account suspensions and this type of 
activity shifting off of Twitter.”
132
  Twitter went on to say that:  
 
Violent threats and the promotion of terrorism deserve no place 
on Twitter and, like other social networks, our rules make that 
clear.  We have teams around the world actively investigating 
reports of rule violations, identifying violating conduct, partnering 
with organizations countering extremist content online, and 
working with law enforcement entities when appropriate.
133
 
 
Twitter’s position thus far seems to be that it will make efforts to both 
identify and remove accounts when it knows an account is being operated 
                                                          
130.  Jessi Hempel, Twitter’s Latest Challenge: Deciding Who’s a Terrorist, WIRED (Jan. 
8, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2016/01/twitters-latest-challenge-is-deciding-whos-a-
terrorist/ [http://perma.cc/HFX9-JRPZ]. 
 
131.  This applies to all social media platforms as well. 
 
132.  Twitter, supra note 111. 
 
133.  Id. 
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by a terrorist organization.  But should the obligation be on Twitter to 
identify theses accounts in the first instance?  Why not leave this burden on 
the government to identify terrorist organizations? 
It is hard to know who is in the better position of being able to do so 
from a technological standpoint.  Twitter has acknowledged that there “is 
no ‘magic algorithm’ for identifying terrorist content on the Internet, so 
global online platforms are forced to make challenging judgement [sic] 
calls based on very limited information and guidance.”
134
  Perhaps the 
government’s recent outreach to partner with Silicon Valley to combat ISIS 
underscores that policing accounts is best approached as a joint effort.
135
 
From a policy perspective, these efforts articulated by Twitter should 
be enough to highlight that it is not deliberately indifferent to the 
exploitation of its platform by terrorist organizations.
136
  Facebook’s more 
aggressive approach to combating the use of its site by terrorists—
particularly in light of the fact that those measures were in place before it 
was a defendant in a material support case—shows the same. 
Social media can and should be a leader in developing technology to 
assist in identifying suspicious accounts.  But it does not follow that it 
should be required to catch and shut down each one.  Such a standard 
would prove impossible to satisfy. 
Causation: does social media need to foresee terrorism as a 
consequence? 
Though courts generally agree that the “by reason of” language does 
not require a plaintiff to prove but-for causation,
137
 there is a circuit split 
                                                          
134.  Id. 
 
135.  McLaughlin, supra note 60. 
 
136.  The exception would be where the government has alerted it to a DFTO.  In such a 
case, it would be hard to argue that the social media was reluctant to shut down such an account 
(unless its own in-depth internal investigation gave it a strong reason to oppose the request).  
Again, this is complicated by the varying definitions of “terrorism” used by different 
governments around the globe and their varying incentives for shutting down accounts.  It would 
seem that, at a minimum, the social media company should engage in some due diligence with 
respect to a shut-down request, even if it made the decision to keep the account open. 
 
137.  Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 507 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting that a 
“but for” cause cannot be required in the section 2333(a) context); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 97 
F. Supp. 3d 287, 323 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that “requiring ‘but for’ causation would 
effectively annul the civil liability provisions of the ATA”). 
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regarding what exactly must be proven.
138
  The Second Circuit requires 
proximate causation, compelling plaintiffs to establish a sufficient basis to 
believe the material support proximately caused the attack.
139
  In other 
words, the terrorist attack must be a foreseeable consequence of the 
specific act of support and not simply a general risk of providing the 
service.  The Seventh Circuit has a more lenient requirement.
140
  Under its 
standard, a plaintiff has to prove only that there was a substantial 
probability that the social media site’s provision of services was a 
contributing cause of the attack.
141
  This is a remarkably broad theory of 
causation which could “potentially expose every Internet service provider 
to liability for horrible crimes committed anywhere in the world, not only 
by their users but even by individuals who were loosely affiliated with or 
even just inspired by those users.”
142
  The Ninth Circuit, where the Fields’s 
and Gonzalez’s suits against social media were filed, has yet to answer this 
question. 
In the case brought by Ms. Fields, Twitter predictably argued that 
proximate causation is the appropriate standard.  Twitter contended that the 
Second Circuit was correct and that the Seventh Circuit “ignored the 
language Congress chose in crafting the statute” when it interpreted the 
statute as requiring less than proximate cause.
143
  Even though it is in 
Twitter’s best interest to have this higher standard applied, courts have 
acknowledged that applying proximate causation in ATA material support 
                                                          
138.  See generally Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2013); Boim II, 549 F.3d 
685. 
 
139.  Rothstein, 708 F.3d at 95 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[I]f, in creating civil liability through § 
2333, Congress had intended to allow recovery upon a showing lower than proximate cause, we 
think it either would have so stated expressly or would at least have chosen language that had not 
commonly been interpreted to require proximate cause for the prior 100 years.”). 
 
140.  Boim II, 549 F.3d at 695–700. 
 
141.  Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (noting that under the Seventh Circuit’s standard, 
“because money is fungible, a defendant’s provision of assistance to a terrorist organization does 
not have to be either a necessary or sufficient cause of the harm suffered by an ATA plaintiff or 
an ATA plaintiff’s decedent in order for a section 2333(a) plaintiff to recover.”). 
 
142.  Defendant Twitter, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss at 22, Fields v. Twitter, Inc., No. 3:16-
cv-00213-WHO (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2016). 
 
143.  Id. at 20 n.6. 
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claims is complicated and is not necessarily a win for defendants.
144
  Even 
assuming the Ninth Circuit adopted the proximate causation standard, the 
outcome may not necessarily be favorable to social media platforms, 
particularly in a case with a strong set of facts.
145
 
Under a proximate causation standard, defendants are generally 
“liable only for those injuries that might have reasonably been anticipated 
as a natural consequence of the defendant’s actions.”
146
  For a social media 
platform to be liable in a civil action brought under this statute, the 
resultant terrorist attack must have been a foreseeable consequence of 
allowing the terrorists to use its services to assist in some way with the 
attack.  For example, in the actions brought by Ms. Fields and Mr. 
Gonzalez, the plaintiffs would be required to prove that social media could 
have reasonably anticipated that ISIS’s use of its services to recruit, 
organize, and fundraise would result in the attacks on Nohemi and Carl.  
Social media’s response has been that the allegations fail to draw a 
connection between the attacks and any specific tweets.
147
  In the case 
brought by Ms. Fields, Twitter argued that “not even the thinnest of reeds 
connects [it] to this terrible event,”
148
 contending that its “sole alleged 
connection to this controversy is that, among the hundreds of millions of 
individuals around the world who disseminate information to one another 
via the Twitter platform, there are some people affiliated with, or 
supportive of, ISIS who allegedly used the platform to transmit information 
for purposes of promoting ISIS’s terrorist activities and agenda.”
149
 Indeed, 
as argued in Twitter’s Motion to Dismiss: 
 
The Complaint makes no attempt to connect Twitter directly to 
Abu Zaid or his attack.  It does not allege that ISIS recruited Abu 
                                                          
144.  See Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (providing an in-depth analysis). 
 
145.  This idea will be further discussed in Section III, infra. 
 
146.  Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim I), 291 
F.3d 1000, 1012 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Abecassis v. Wyatt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 623, 665 (S.D. 
Tex. 2010). 
 
147.  Defendant Twitter, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 142, at 1. 
 
148.  Id. at 2. 
 
149.  Id. at 4 (citation omitted). 
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Zaid over the Twitter platform.  Nor does it allege that Abu Zaid 
or ISIS used the Twitter platform to plan, carry out, or raise 
money for the attack.  It does not even allege that Abu Zaid had a 
Twitter account or ever accessed the Twitter platform.  And 
although the Complaint devotes considerable attention to how 
other terrorists allegedly used the Twitter platform, it never 
explains how that alleged use had even the remotest connection to 
Abu Zaid’s ‘lone wolf’ attack.
150
 
 
Ms. Fields suggested that it “was foreseeable that giving ISIS unfettered 
access to Twitter accounts would enable them to recruit, fundraise, and 
spread their propaganda and that this would lead to the deaths of innocent 
civilians.”
151
  This argument, however, does not rise to the level of 
causation required by a proximate causation standard because there must 
be a tighter link between the act of support and the terrorist event.  A 
stronger argument may have been that ISIS’s use of social media incited 
this lone wolf attack, but that too would likely fail if the Ninth Circuit uses 
the proximate causation standard. 
An easier road for plaintiffs would be under the substantial 
probability standard.  Should the Ninth Circuit adopt the Seventh Circuit’s 
substantial probability standard, plaintiffs like Ms. Fields and Mr. 
Gonzalez would only need to prove that there was a substantial probability 
that the provision of services by social media was a contributing cause of 
the attack.  For example, Ms. Fields or Mr. Gonzalez could meet this 
standard if they could uncover additional information during discovery 
about Twitter’s resistance to government efforts to combat terrorism via 
monitoring and removal of suspected terrorist accounts.  This is regardless 
of whether ISIS’s use of Twitter incited the lone wolf to attack or whether 
the attack was carried out on behalf of ISIS.  This type of standard shifts 
the risk to social media platforms where there is a strong likelihood that 
harm will flow from the provision of services to terrorists. 
 
 
 
                                                          
150.  Id. at 5. 
 
151.  Mark Sullivan, How Twitter Will Win Lawsuit Brought By Woman Widowed By ISIS, 
FAST COMPANY (Jan. 20, 2016, 3:45 PM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3055539/how-twitter-
will-win-the-lawsuit-brought-by-the-woman-widowed-by-isis [http://perma.cc/F78N-XSY5]. 
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3. What standard should the Ninth Circuit adopt? 
 
The Ninth Circuit should follow the Second Circuit and adopt a 
proximate causation standard in material support cases.  The words “by 
reason of” suggest it is the appropriate standard.  The Supreme Court has 
interpreted identical language to require a showing of proximate cause.
152
  
Despite the interpretation of the Seventh Circuit to the contrary, most other 
courts considering the issue have held that the ATA contemplates a 
requirement of proximate causation.
153
  District courts in the Second 
Circuit considering this issue came to that conclusion
154
 long before the 
Second Circuit rubber-stamped that approach.
155
  District courts from the 
D.C. Circuit and the Fifth Circuit agree.
156
  Additionally, before reversing 
its position following an en banc hearing, the Seventh Circuit originally 
interpreted the ATA to require a finding of proximate cause.  As the 
Second Circuit explained, the “by reason of” language has a “well-
understood meaning” and that meaning does not “permit recovery on a 
showing of less than proximate cause, as the term is ordinarily used.”
157
  
Indeed, in considering the interpretation of the same language, albeit in a 
different context, the Supreme Court explained that it has long construed 
those words to require proof of proximate cause.
158
 
This interpretation makes sense.  Proximate causation balances 
                                                          
152.  See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 265–68 (1992) (interpreting 
“by reason of” language in civil RICO provision to require a showing that the defendant’s 
conduct proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury). 
 
153.  E.g., Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 
154.  Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 507–08 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Strauss v. 
Credit Lyonnais, S.A., No. CV-06-0702 (CPS), 2006 WL 2862704, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 
2006); Stutts v. De Dietrich Grp., No. 03-CV-4058 (ILG), 2006 WL 1867060, at *3, *4 
(E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2006).  
 
155.  Rothstein, 708 F.3d at 95. 
 
156.  Abecassis v. Wyatt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 623, 665 (S.D. Tex. 2010); Kilburn v. Socialist 
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 376 F.3d 1123, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see Sisso v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, No. 05-0394 (JDB), 2007 WL 2007582, at *11 (D. D.C. July 5, 2007). 
 
157.  Rothstein, 708 F.3d at 95. 
 
158.  See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) (interpreting the 
same language in a civil RICO case). 
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accountability with foreseeability: it requires that the defendant’s conduct 
was a “substantial factor” in the injury and that the injury was “reasonably 
foreseeable” as a natural consequence.
159
  Such a requirement protects 
against concerns that “civil liability could be extended to a potentially 
endless class of groups and individuals that provide even the most remote 
support to a terrorist group”
160
 and that “it will lead to perpetual liability for 
all future attacks conducted by the terrorist group.”
161
  This approach is 
fair: unless there is a sufficient nexus to connect the usage of the social 
media platform to the injury-causing event, liability cannot exist. 
Even under this standard, however, social media is not off the hook.  
These companies would have cause for concern if a DFTO tweets, posts, 
blogs, or otherwise uses social media to communicate about a forthcoming 
attack with some level of detail so that a victim of that attack could draw a 
direct connection between the service and the injury.  Terrorists do this all 
the time.  ISIS has already used Twitter to send messages to United States 
citizens, warning that they will be targets of ISIS.
162
  After President 
Obama authorized military airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq, one tweet 
warned: “if America attacks #Iraq; every American embassy in the world 
will be exposed and attacked with car bombs.”
163
  A victim injured in an 
ISIS attack on an embassy would satisfy the proximate causation 
requirement with that mere tweet.  It is also possible that causation would 
be met where a lone wolf attacker was radicalized online via a terrorist’s 
social media accounts. 
Social media would also be on the hook for causation where it has 
                                                          
159.  Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1012 (explaining that the most common test of proximate cause 
is foreseeability and that defendants in tort actions are generally “liable only for those injuries 
that might have reasonably been anticipated as a natural consequence of the defendant’s 
actions”); see also Abecassis, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 659. 
 
160.  Budoff, supra note 69. 
 
161.  Id. at 1083. 
 
162.  See David Martosko, ‘A Message from ISIS to the US’: Islamist Militants Tweet 
Gruesome Images of Dead American Soldiers and Vow to Blow Up Embassies as Terrorist 
Convoy is Wiped Out in Second Round of Airstrikes, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 9, 2014, 8:49 PM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2720309/AmessagefromISIStoUS-Islamist-militants-
tweet-gruesome-images-dead-American-soldiers-vow-blow-embassies-Obama-launches-
airstrikes.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2016). 
 
163.  Id. 
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allowed terrorists to buy and sell weapons through its site.  “A terrorist 
hoping to buy an antiaircraft weapon in recent years needed to look no 
further than Facebook.”
164
  An April 2016 study by Armament Research 
Services, a private consultancy group, along with an investigation by the 
New York Times, revealed that Facebook has “been hosting sprawling 
online arms bazaars, offering weapons ranging from handguns and 
grenades to heavy machine guns and guided missiles.”
165
  These bazaars 
appeared “in regions where the Islamic State has its strongest presence.”
166
  
Using Facebook’s closed groups and private messaging, sales could be 
arranged and transactions executed. 
Such sales and solicitations violate Facebook’s policies, which since 
January 2016 forbid the private sales of guns and ammunition.
167
  
However, it is unclear how involved Facebook is with enforcing this 
policy.  One commentator suggested that “Facebook continues to host a 
bustling arms marketplace, where everything from handguns to rifles are 
easy to procure, often without a background check.”
168
  A material support 
claim against Facebook where the causal link was an arms sale would 
clearly satisfy this causation requirement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
164.  C.J. Chivers, Facebook Groups Act as Weapons Bazaars for Militias, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/world/middleeast/facebook-weapons-syria-
libya-iraq.html. 
 
165.  Id.  See generally N. R. Jenzen-Jones & Graeme Rice, The Online Trade of Light 
Weapons in Libya, SANA DISPATCHES 1 (Apr. 2016), 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/R-SANA/SANA-Dispatch6-Online-trade.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/5XU7-X9K9]. 
 
166.  Chivers, supra note 164.  See generally Jenzen-Jones & Rice, supra note 165, at 2. 
 
167.  See Chivers, supra note 164. 
 
168.  Bryan Schatz & Alexander Sammon, Facebook’s Ban on Gun Sales is Being 
Enforced by a Few Dedicated Users, MOTHER JONES (June 27, 2016, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/gun-sales-facebook-flagged-reported 
[http://perma.cc/9LFT-RX6F]. 
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B. Other Arguments Against Liability for Social Media 
 
There are several policy reasons supporting a discharge of liability for 
social media in material support cases. 
 
1. Independent advocacy is not service. 
 
The most intuitive response to lawsuits attempting to hold social 
media liable for terrorist acts is that it is unjust to penalize those companies 
for acts of terrorism when they have simply created communication 
platforms available to everyone in the world with an Internet connection.  
In other words, social media did not create its respective platforms to give 
a voice or support to terrorist organizations and further did not offer the 
services at terrorist’s requests.  While much of this argument is addressed 
with respect to the mens rea element, social media might have a secondary 
argument that to meet the definition of “service” as required by the ATA, it 
would have needed to do something at the command of the terrorist 
organizations. 
In 2010, the Supreme Court distinguished between conduct in 
coordination with or at the direction of a terrorist group, which the statute 
prohibits, and wholly independent advocacy or activity that might benefit 
the group, which the Constitution protects.
169
  The Humanitarian Law 
Project (“HLP”), a nongovernmental organization, sought to help the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party in Turkey and Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (both DFTOs) learn how to peacefully resolve conflicts.
170
  It 
recognized that this assistance fit the material support definitions of 
“training,” “expert advice or assistance,” “service,” and “personnel” 
despite the fact that the support was in the form of speech and therefore 
challenged the constitutionality of the ATA.
171
  The Supreme Court held 
that it did not matter that the HLP’s support was speech: 
 
Given the sensitive interests in national security and foreign 
affairs at stake, the political branches have adequately 
                                                          
169.  See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 24 (2010).     
 
170.  See id. at 14–15. 
 
171.  See id. at 21–22 (arguing that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, as will be 
discussed further in Section III). 
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substantiated their determination that, to serve the Government’s 
interest in preventing terrorism, it was necessary to prohibit 
providing material support in the form of training, expert advice, 
personnel, and services to foreign terrorist groups, even assuming 
the supporters meant to promote only the groups’ non-violent 
ends.
172
 
 
It did matter, however, that the support was more than just independent 
advocacy.  The Court drew a line and held that “service” under the ATA 
contemplated more than independent activity: it required concerted 
activity.
173
  Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court: “Context confirms 
that ordinary meaning here.  The statute prohibits providing a service ‘to a 
foreign terrorist organization’ . . . . The use of the word ‘to’ indicates a 
connection between the service and the foreign group.”
174
  Social media 
platforms would therefore have a strong argument that despite having 
general knowledge that terrorist groups used their services, they cannot be 
liable under the statute because their activity in providing the platform was 
performed wholly independent of any terrorist group. 
This argument has not been raised yet in the pending cases against 
social media.
175
  This is possibly because each defendant’s Terms of 
Service define the services it provides users in such a way as to connect the 
services to the recipient.  This definition is “fully consistent with Roberts’ 
interpretation of precisely what the statute forbids.”
176
  Yet the argument is 
still compelling as there is something unsettling about finding social media 
liable for failing to exclude DFTOs from a service available to anyone. 
 
 
                                                          
172.  Id. at 36. 
 
173.  Id. at 4 (“Independently advocating for a cause is different from the prohibited act of 
providing a service ‘to a foreign terrorist organization.’”). 
 
174.  Id. at 24. 
 
175.  Zoe Bedell & Benjamin Wittes, Tweeting Terrorists, Part II: Does it Violate the 
Law for Twitter to Let Terrorist Groups Have Accounts?, LAWFARE (Feb. 14, 2016, 6:35 PM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/tweeting-terrorists-part-ii-does-it-violate-law-twitter-let-terrorist-
groups-have-accounts [http://perma.cc/N4CW-THVC]. 
 
176.  Id. 
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2. The statute is vague as applied. 
 
Social media could also argue that because it cannot know which 
users of its ubiquitous platforms are actually members of terrorist 
organizations, the statute is vague as applied.  That was precisely the 
argument made by the HLP.  It argued the statute did not provide adequate 
notice of what was prohibited, particularly as it related to the definitions of 
“training,” “expert advice or assistance,” “service,” and “personnel.”
177
 
The Court rejected that challenge, distinguishing those terms from 
others that it had previously struck down as too vague, terms like 
“annoying” and “indecent.”
178
  It held that the term was conspicuous 
because Congress had added narrowing definitions to the statute over time, 
it provided clear, objective definitions of what constitutes support, and the 
definitions did not require “untethered, subjective judgments.”
179
  The 
Court acknowledged that the statute may not be clear in every case, but 
was clear enough for the HLP to recognize that its conduct “readily” fell 
into the common understanding of what those “vague” terms meant.
180
  The 
HLP further argued that it would not be able to determine exactly how 
much direction or coordination would be necessary for an activity to 
constitute a “service” under the ATA.
181
  For example, “Would any 
communication with any member be sufficient?  With a leader?  Must the 
‘relationship’ have any formal elements, such as an employment or 
contractual relationship?  What about a relationship through an 
intermediary?”
182
  The Court dismissed those concerns as hypothetical 
because the HLP did not articulate “the degree to which they seek to 
coordinate their advocacy”
183
 with the DFTOs and “instead described the 
                                                          
177.  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 19 (2010). 
 
178.  Id. at 20. 
 
179.  Id. at 21. 
 
180.  Id. 
 
181.  See Reply Brief for Conditional Cross-Petitioners at 5–9, Humanitarian Law Project 
v. Holder, 557 U.S. 966 (2009) (No. 09-89), 2009 WL 2904604, at *8. 
 
182.  Holder, 561 U.S. at 24. 
 
183.  Id. at 25. 
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form of their intended advocacy only in the most general terms.”
184
 
The same may not be true when it comes to social media.  The 
concern that social media is knowingly providing a service under the 
statute is not merely hypothetical.  Gabe Rottman of the ACLU has 
suggested social media has a credible argument that “in the context of 
providing ‘communications equipment,’ one could argue that the ‘service’ 
has to be something like renting a satellite phone (not passively providing 
data and hosting services).”
185
  Whether this argument has legs is unclear, 
but there are strong policy reasons to support a definition that contemplates 
more than passively providing data and hosting services.  A broad 
definition exposes just about any provider of web-based services to 
liability.  Under such a broad definition, it is not clear where to draw the 
line.  David Cole, who argued on behalf of the Humanitarian Law Project, 
underscores just how broad this interpretation is: 
 
What about Google, Facebook, or Verizon, all of which have 
almost certainly provided their “services,” in the form of Google 
searches, social networking, and phone and email access, to 
Hamas or its members.  For that matter, what about Pepsi and 
Coca-Cola, who have surely sold soda bottles to Hamas in the 
Gaza Strip?  What about ExxonMobil and Shell Oil, whose gas 
has very likely powered Hamas vehicles?  And what about public 
radio and CNN, whose news services are available around the 
world, including in Gaza?
186
 
 
The Court did suggest that such a far-reaching application of the ATA 
would be frustrated by the “knowledge requirement of the statute [which] 
reduces any potential for vagueness,”
187
 but Cole’s frustration with the 
broad scope of the Court’s interpretation is well-founded. 
This is not to ignore policy implications of a broader definition—that 
                                                          
184.  Id. 
 
185.  Gabe Rottman, Hamas, Twitter and the First Amendment, ACLU: FREE FUTURE 
(Nov. 21, 2012, 3:25 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/hamas-twitter-and-first-amendment 
[http://perma.cc/WDF9-W6XS]. 
 
186.  Cole, supra note 88.  
 
187.  Holder, 561 U.S. at 21. 
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the goal of shutting down terrorist networks justifies a wide net—but it 
does suggest that there is a viable argument for vagueness as applied to the 
social media defendants and certainly others who are similarly situated. 
 
IV. CAN SECTION 230 SAVE SOCIAL MEDIA? 
 
In the present cases against social media, the facts weigh in the 
defendant’s favor—neither plaintiff has alleged a strong causal link 
between activity on Twitter, Facebook, or YouTube (Google) and the 
attack.  But even assuming the present complaints were both dismissed, 
social media still has reason for concern.  The persuasive arguments 
against a causal link in these cases will not be true of every future 
litigant.
188
  Moreover, a plaintiff in the Seventh Circuit would face a lower 
causation burden so even on a weak causal link, a case may proceed and 
even succeed against social media.
189
  Instead, it would benefit social 
media to have the cases dismissed because the claims were legally 
untenable, not because the facts were not strong enough.  Given the broad 
interpretation of the ATA by courts, coupled with the government’s 
priority to attack terrorism from every angle,
190
 it is unlikely for a court to 
find as a matter of law that social media could not be held liable under the 
ATA under any set of facts.  However, a different statute could offer an 
answer. 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“Section 230”) 
protects Internet providers from liability for content posted on their sites by 
third parties.
191
  To encourage companies to set up platforms where people 
can speak openly, section 230 provides that an interactive computer service 
(broadly defined to include a variety of websites, including social media 
platforms) cannot be treated as the publisher or speaker of third party 
content.
192
  Simply put, section 230 protects social media sites, among 
                                                          
188.  Recall the earlier hypothetical where a terrorist group tweets about a forthcoming 
attack with some level of detail so that a victim of that attack can draw a direct connection 
between the service and the injury.  Or when an attack happens and the weapons used can be 
traced to a purchase via Facebook messenger. 
 
189.  See, e.g., Boim II, 549 F.3d at 685. 
 
190.  Arguably at the expense of free speech on occasion. 
 
191.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012). 
 
192.  Id. § 230(c)(1), (f)(2). 
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others, from civil liability for publishing content such as posts, pages, 
comments, tweets, etcetera generated by its users. 
A recent case from the District of Columbia Circuit provides a helpful 
example.  In Klayman v. Zuckerberg, the plaintiff alleged claims against 
Facebook for failing to promptly take down a page on its site entitled 
“Third Palestinian Intifada.”
193
  The page was created by users and called 
for Muslims to rise up and kill Jewish people.
194
  The district court 
dismissed the claim, holding that section 230 shielded Facebook from 
liability because (1) it qualified as an interactive computer service; (2) the 
content was provided by third parties; and (3) the plaintiff attempted to 
treat Facebook as the publisher of the offending content.
195
 
When the first case against social media based on the ATA was filed 
in January, the immediate reaction of several commentators was that 
section 230 was clearly applicable and would shield Twitter from 
liability.
196
  But its application here is uncertain because as will be 
discussed below, whether section 230 affords immunity hinges upon 
whether the plaintiff is attempting to treat the defendant as the publisher of 
information posted by third parties.  Here, the theory of liability against 
social media is not based on the content posted on its sites by terrorists, but 
instead on the consequences of allowing terrorists to use those services.  In 
other words, social media is not being sued as the publisher or speaker of 
objectionable content, which are the types of claims section 230 guards 
against. 
 
                                                          
 
193.  Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 
194.  Id. 
 
195.  Id. at 1357–59. 
 
196.  See, e.g., Grant Burningham, The Twitter Revolution Meets ISIS, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 
26, 2016, 2:35 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/twitter-revolution-meets-isis-419877 
[http://perma.cc/T9MY-TSHY]; David Kravets, Twitter Provides Material Support to ISIS, 
Lawsuit Alleges, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 14, 2016, 10:43 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2016/01/twitter-provides-material-support-to-isis-lawsuit-alleges/ [http://perma.cc/8CEG-
Z9WR]; Jeff John Roberts, Twitter Sued by Widow of ISIS Victim, FORTUNE (Jan. 14, 2016, 
12:04 PM), http://fortune.com/2016/01/14/twitter-isis-lawsuit/ [http://perma.cc/S7ZD-VCYJ]; 
Mark Sullivan, How Twitter Will Win Lawsuit Brought By Woman Widowed By ISIS, FAST 
COMPANY (Jan. 20, 2016, 3:45 PM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3055539/how-twitter-will-
win-the-lawsuit-brought-by-the-woman-widowed-by-isis [http://perma.cc/F78N-XSY5]. 
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A. A Closer Look at the Contours of Section 230 Immunity 
 
Twenty years ago, Congress passed the Communications Decency 
Act to control and limit the exposure of children to indecent and obscene 
material online.
197
  As perhaps a concession to the Internet industry, which 
was up in arms about the Act, section 230 was tacked on to address the 
growing concern that websites could be liable for content posted by third 
parties.
198
  The following year, the Supreme Court struck down most of the 
Act as unconstitutional, leaving only section 230 intact.
199
  Since that time, 
section 230 has evolved into what many commentators consider to be “one 
of the most valuable tools for protecting freedom of expression and 
innovation on the Internet.”
200
 
When it included section 230 as part of the Act, Congress recognized 
that the Internet “represent[ed] an extraordinary advance in the availability 
of educational and informational resources” and “offer[ed] a forum for a 
true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural 
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”
201
  More 
importantly, the Internet was flourishing “with a minimum of government 
regulation.”
202
  Thus, Congress made it the “policy of the United States” to 
“promote the continued development of the Internet” and “to preserve the 
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet 
and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation[.]”
203
 
                                                          
197.  See generally 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2012) (held unconstitutional by Reno v. ACLU, 521 
U.S. 844 (1997)). 
 
198.  CDA 230: Legislative History, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, 
http://www.eff.org/issues/cda230/legislative-history [http://perma.cc/PHN9-8NW4] (“Worried 
about the future of free speech online and responding directly to Stratton Oakmont, 
Representatives Chris Cox (R-CA) and Ron Wyden (D-OR) introduced an amendment to the 
Communications Decency Act that would end up becoming Section 230.”). 
 
199.  See generally Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 
200.  CDA 230: The Most Important Law Protecting Internet Speech, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUNDATION, http://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 [http://perma.cc/CA3G-EH3L]. 
 
201.  47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1), (a)(3) (1998). 
 
202.  Id. § 230(a)(4). 
 
203.  Id. § 230(b)(1)–(4) (stating “(1) to promote the continued development of the 
Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media; (2) to preserve the 
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The result is that section 230 commands that “[n]o provider or user of 
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker 
of any information provided by another information content provider” and 
“[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed 
under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”
204
  
Interactive computer services are broadly defined to include not only 
traditional Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”), which are common carriers 
such as AT&T, Verizon, or Time Warner, but also a range of interactive 
computer service providers, which includes basically any online service 
that publishes third party content.
205
  Thus, section 230 prohibits claims 
that treat websites as the “publisher” of third party content, regardless of 
whether the website exercised a traditional editorial function in reviewing, 
editing, or deciding whether to publish or to withdraw from publication any 
content created by users of its service.
206
 
Since its inception, section 230 has protected websites such as 
Facebook, Google, Yahoo!, Craigslist, and others from liability stemming 
from the content posted on their sites by users, whether or not the 
respective website tried to block, remove, or police that content.
207
  Of 
course, the third parties who created and posted the illegal material are not 
immune from liability.
208
 
                                                          
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive 
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation; (3) to encourage the development of 
technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by individuals, 
families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services; [and] (4) to 
remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies 
that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online 
material . . .”). 
 
204.  Id. § 230(c)(1), (e)(3). 
 
205.  Id. § 230(f)(2). 
 
206.  Defamation: CDA Cases, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION: INTERNET LAW 
TREATISE (Mar. 27, 2013, 6:02 PM), 
http://ilt.eff.org/index.php/Defamation:_CDA_Cases#Exercise_of_Editorial_Functions 
[http://perma.cc/XXV9-KSQ7]. 
 
207.  See generally Klayman, 753 F.3d 1354; Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 
1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703 (Ct. App. 2002); Barnes v. 
Yahoo!, Inc. (Barnes II), 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 
F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003); Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 
208.  Gentry, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703. 
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The rationale behind such sweeping immunity was that it would 
“encourage interactive computer services and users of such services to self-
police the Internet for obscenity and other offensive material . . . .”
209
  Prior 
to the Act, if a website attempted to moderate third party posts to remove 
obscene material, for example, it was treated as a publisher for liability 
purposes and could be held liable if it was unsuccessful in removing all 
such material.  A website that did nothing, on the other hand, faced no 
liability because it had no involvement, either in the form of publication or 
removal, with the content.
210
  Thus, Congress attempted to allay the 
concern that a website’s efforts to remove objectionable content might 
expose it to liability even when trying to be a “good online citizen.”
211
  
Providing immunity accomplished this goal.  Considering the sheer volume 
of material that is posted to many websites on any given day, policing all of 
the content would prove impossible and so the natural response of social 
media in such a situation without section 230 would be to do nothing. 
Because it was concerned with protecting children, this was not the 
outcome Congress wanted.  In passing section 230 and allowing sites to 
voluntarily filter content, Congress spared social media platforms from the 
grim choice of either performing some content-editing to remove obscene 
and offensive material or policing no content at all. 
 
B. Limits of Section 230 
 
Though immunity under section 230 is far-reaching, it is not without 
limits.  Immunity is not available when an interactive computer service 
provider is the party responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of content.  In those cases, a computer service provider will 
be deemed the “information content provider” and can be held liable for 
that content.
212
 
The Act also expressly carves out immunity from federal criminal 
                                                          
209.  Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003); see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) 
(1998). 
 
210.  Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1029. 
 
211.  Id. 
 
212.  Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123 (“Under the statutory scheme, an ‘interactive computer 
service’ qualifies for immunity so long as it does not also function as an ‘information content 
provider’ for the portion of the statement or publication at issue.”). 
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law, intellectual property law, and communications privacy law.
213
  This 
means that when an interactive computer service provider itself violates a 
specific federal criminal law, for example, it will lose immunity under 
section 230
214
 and the government can pursue charges against it. 
Importantly, this does not translate into a loss of immunity against a 
civil suit based on the same conduct.  Section 230 has continued to insulate 
providers against civil claims even when they are based on federal criminal 
statutes.
215
  For example, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Texas dismissed claims that Yahoo! was tortiously liable to 
victims of child pornography because it violated a federal criminal statute 
by knowingly profiting from the trafficking of child pornography.
216
  Most 
other courts that have considered the issue are in accord with this policy.
217
  
Thus, even assuming Ms. Fields could show that Twitter violated the 
                                                          
213.  47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)(3) (1998). 
 
214.  Id. § 230(e)(1) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement 
of . . . [any] Federal criminal statute.”). 
 
215.  See, e.g., Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 WL 3813758, at *5 (E.D. 
Tex. Dec. 27, 2006) (holding that section 230 immunity applied, even if Yahoo! knowingly 
profited from a site where members exchanged sexually explicit photographs of minors).  See 
generally Doe v. MySpace, Inc. (MySpace, Inc. I), 474 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d, 
Doe v. MySpace, Inc. (MySpace, Inc. II), 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that MySpace 
was entitled to immunity under section 230 against claims of a 14 year old who was sexually 
assaulted by a man she met on the site). 
 
216.  Bates, 2006 WL 3813758, at *5, *22 (“Congress decided not to allow private 
litigants to bring civil claims based on their own beliefs that a service provider’s actions violated 
the criminal laws.”). 
 
217.  See, e.g., Obado v. Magedson, No. 13-2382 (JAP), 2014 WL 3778261, at *8 (D. N.J. 
July 31, 2014), aff’d, 612 F. App’x 90 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[T]he CDA exception for federal criminal 
statutes applies to government prosecutions, not to civil private rights of action . . . .”); 
GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 760 (Tex. App. 2014) (finding that section 230 
affords interactive computer service providers immunity from civil liability even if the posted 
content is illegal or forms the basis of a criminal prosecution); Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. 
Supp. 2d 961, 965 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (holding that the complaint’s reference to a criminal 
statute did not bring a nuisance cause of action within the statutory exception to CDA immunity 
provided under section 230(e)(1)).  See generally M.A. ex rel. P.K. v. Vill. Voice Media 
Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (E.D. Miss. 2011) (the illegal or highly offensive nature of 
website content does not alter the controlling determination of whether the information was 
created by an information content provider other than the defendant).  Two courts, the Eastern 
District in Missouri and the Seventh Circuit, have considered arguments that an ISP could lose 
section 230 immunity if it aided and abetted a crime.  See, e.g., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 
(7th Cir. 2003).  
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criminal provisions of the ATA, Twitter would have a very strong 
argument that if section 230 applied, it would bar her civil claim based on 
that violation of federal law. 
 
C.  When Section 230 Applies and the Distinction  
Social Media Would Like to Avoid 
 
Three elements are required for section 230 immunity: (1) the 
defendant must be a provider or user of an “interactive computer service”; 
(2) the asserted claims must treat the defendant as a publisher or speaker of 
information; and (3) the challenged communication must be “information 
provided by another information content provider.”
218
 
Social media sites easily meet the first prong as they provide 
“interactive computer services.”
219
  For example, Twitter is an operator of 
an interactive website that allows users to send and read short 140-
character messages called “tweets.” 
220
  Facebook operates an interactive 
site that allows users to create profiles, post commentary, links, images, 
videos, and interact with other users both via private messages and public 
posts on other user’s “walls.”
221
  YouTube offers a platform for uploading, 
viewing, sharing, and commenting on videos.
222
 
The second and third prongs pose a challenge for social media 
platforms in cases where Plaintiffs assert material support claims against 
them.  This is because section 230 is designed to protect services from 
being treated as the publisher of content posted by third parties.  In cases 
against social media brought under the ATA, the claim made by plaintiffs 
is that the service is supporting terrorism by permitting terrorists to use its 
                                                          
218.  Obado, 612 F. App’x at 4; Kabbaj v. Google, Inc., No. 13-1522-RGA, 2014 WL 
1369864, at *2 (D. Del. Apr. 7, 2014); Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 
413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003) (Gould, J., 
dissenting).  
  
219.  See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003); 
see also Beckman v. Match.com, No. 2:13-CV-97 (JCM NJK), 2013 WL 2355512, at *3 (D. 
Nev. May 29, 2013); Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 725 (N.D. Ohio 2007), aff’d, 
551 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2008); MySpace, Inc. II, 528 F.3d at 418.  
 
220.  TWITTER, www.twitter.com [http://perma.cc/2BTK-ND62]. 
 
221.  FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com [http://perma.cc/BMY8-ZAUX]. 
 
222.  YOUTUBE, http://www.YouTube.com [http://perma.cc/2SS7-XWUH]. 
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service.  This is distinct from a claim that the social media site is liable for 
the content of a specific tweet or post made by a terrorist organization.  The 
latter is the type of claim section 230 routinely guards against. 
This distinction is exemplified by Klayman v. Zuckerberg, discussed 
supra, a case that Twitter relied upon in its Motion to Dismiss in the case 
brought by Ms. Fields.
223
  Recall that in Klayman, the plaintiff’s claims 
were based upon a Facebook page entitled “Third Palestinian Intifada,” 
which called for Muslims to kill Jewish people.
224
  After Plaintiff 
complained about the page, Facebook removed it, but not promptly enough 
for the Plaintiff.
225
  He filed suit against Facebook and its founder, Mark 
Zuckerberg, alleging that their delay in removing that page and similar 
pages constituted intentional assault and negligence.”
226
  The distinction 
between Klayman and the claims brought under the ATA is critical: the 
plaintiff in Klayman alleged that Facebook was liable to him for content 
posted on its site by a third party, an allegation which section 230 expressly 
prevents.  There was no allegation that Facebook violated the ATA or that 
the ATA was even at issue in the Klayman case.  The cause of action was 
based on negligence and assault and liability was predicated on Facebook’s 
status or conduct as a publisher.  The plaintiff sought to hold Facebook 
liable for the exact conduct that section 230 prohibits and consequently, the 
Court properly dismissed the suit.
227
 
Conversely, in the cases brought under the ATA, plaintiffs have 
argued that social media is liable not for the content posted online (which 
would be a direct analogy to Klayman), but instead for the consequences of 
                                                          
223.  See generally Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 
224.  Id. at 1355. 
 
225.  Id. 
 
226.  Id. 
 
227.  See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc. (Zeran II), 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(stating that the Communications Decency Act protects against liability for the “exercise of a 
publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, 
postpone, or alter content”); Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 422 (1st 
Cir. 2007) (same); Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) (same); Doe v. 
MySpace, Inc. (MySpace, Inc. II), 528 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008) (no liability under the Act 
for “decisions relating to the monitoring, screening, and deletion of content” by an interactive 
computer service provider) (quoting Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 
2003)); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC., 521 F.3d 1157, 
1170–71 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A]ny activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude 
material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune under section 230.”). 
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allowing terrorists to use its services.
228
  The lawsuits are not directed at 
specific, offensive content.
229
  In the present actions, the defendants thus 
far have ignored this distinction, arguing instead that any liability based on 
the use of its platforms to spread propaganda, raise funds, and recruit 
followers, regardless of the effect, is barred by section 230. 
 
V.  SAVING SOCIAL MEDIA UNDER SECTION 230 COMPORTS WITH 
CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BROAD JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 
 
The application of section 230 to cases brought under the ATA may 
not be clear, but the impact of holding social media liable for terrorist acts 
certainly is.  Every content provider that provides communication tools to 
its users would feel the sting if social media were held liable for terrorist 
acts.  These content providers would be forced to fundamentally change the 
speech they allow and the way they interact with users, which would 
consequently chill speech.  If Ms. Fields and Mr. Gonzalez or future 
plaintiffs are able to successfully premise liability on allowing terrorists to 
use social media, instead of premising liability on the harm flowing from 
specific posts, it will frustrate the very goals Congress sought to advance in 
enacting section 230. 
 
A.  Congress Intended to Provide Robust Immunity Under Section 230 
 
The legislative history behind section 230 illustrates that Congress 
wanted to protect online intermediaries from liability in order to encourage 
the unfettered growth of the Internet: 
Congress reasoned that any liability would threaten development of 
the online industry as a medium for new forms of mass communication and 
simultaneously create disincentives to self-regulate such content by content 
providers.  Congress therefore determined that liability should rest with the 
actual wrongdoersthe originators of the illegal and harmful contentand 
not intermediary servers whose systems are sometimes abused by 
                                                          
228.  Complaint at ¶¶ 69–71, Fields v. Twitter, Inc., No. 4:16-CV-00213-KAW (N.D. Cal. 
filed Jan. 13, 2016); Verified Complaint at ¶¶ 1–2, Gonzalez v. Twitter, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-03282 
(N.D. Cal. filed June 14, 2016). 
 
229.  Ironically, if they were, causation might not be as high a hurdle for the plaintiffs. 
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wrongdoers.
230
 
The legislative history indicates that the overarching goal was to 
immunize “providers and users of interactive computer services for actions 
to restrict or to enable restriction of access to objectionable online 
material.”
231
 
Courts have given deference to this goal, broadly interpreting section 
230 to immunize providers and users of ISPs from claims related to 
defamation, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
privacy, and others.
232
 
 
B.  A Broad Reading of Section 230 Would be  
Consistent with Judicial Interpretation of the Statute 
 
The seminal case interpreting section 230 immunity is Zeran v. 
America Online, Inc.
233
  After the Oklahoma City bombing, the plaintiff 
discovered that someone had falsely advertised on America Online that he 
was selling T-shirts containing tasteless slogans about the attack.
234
  As a 
result, the plaintiff received a “flood of abusive phone calls,” which came 
as frequently as every two minutes, in addition to death threats
235
 He sued, 
claiming that AOL “failed to remove the postings immediately, failed to 
notify other subscribers of the message’s false nature and failed to 
                                                          
230.  Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. (Barnes I), No. Civ. 05-926-AA, 2005 WL 3005602, at *2 
(D. Or. Nov. 8, 2005).   
 
231.  H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (including the Conference 
Report from the House of Representatives dated January 31, 1996 as related to 47 U.S.C. § 230 
(1998)). 
 
232.  See, e.g., Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Keynetics, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 523, 536 (D. Md. 
2006) (claim under Maryland Commercial Electronic Mail Act); Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91-
DF-CMC, 2006 WL 3813758, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006) (negligence, negligence per se, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, civil conspiracy and distribution 
of child pornography); Barnes I, 422 F. Supp. 2d, at *4 (negligence claim resulting in personal 
injury); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003) (defamation); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, 
& Co., Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000) (negligence claim); Zeran v. 
Am. Online, Inc. (Zeran II), 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997) (negligence claims).  
 
233.  Zeran II, 129 F.3d at 331–33.  
 
234.  Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc. (Zeran I), 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1127 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
 
235.  Id. at 1128.  
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effectively screen future defamatory material.”
236
  The trial court dismissed 
the action and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that immunity under 
section 230 is extended even when a provider is notified of objectionable 
content on its site.
237
  Zeran’s importance stems from the fact that not only 
was it one of the first cases to interpret section 230, but also because nearly 
every court to consider the issue since has relied on its decision. 
Following Zeran, the Ninth Circuit has characterized immunity under 
section 230(c)(1) as “quite robust”
238
 and other courts of appeal to consider 
the issue are in accord with this characterization.
239
  Ultimately, this broad 
interpretation of section 230 is necessary to avoid a chilling effect on free 
speech.  Faced with restricting speech of its users or facing liability, 
content providers would choose the former.  In recognition of this, courts 
have applied section 230 to cover a variety of different claims.  For 
example, immunity has been applied to a website that offered an “adult” 
services section that allegedly facilitated prostitution,
240
 dating websites,
241
 
e-mail forwards,
242
 links,
243
 and countless others.  The common thread 
uniting each case has been that the plaintiff tried to treat the content 
provider as the publisher of information from a third-party. 
Over the past decade, a thread of cases has emerged against MySpace, 
another social networking website.
244
  In each of these cases, minor females 
                                                          
236.  Doe II v. MySpace Inc., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 148, 154 (Ct. App. 2009). 
 
237.  Zeran II, 129 F.3d at 330.  
 
238.  Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC., 521 F.3d 
1157, 1179 (9th Cir. 2008); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 
2003).  
 
239.  Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 
F.3d 666, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2008); Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 
415 (1st Cir. 2007); Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2003); Ben Ezra, 
Weinstein, & Co., Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000); Zeran II, 129 F.3d 
at 330.  
 
240.  Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 
241.  See generally Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 
242.  Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 514 (Cal. 2006); Mitan v. A. Neumann & 
Associates, LLC, No. 08-6154, 2010 WL 4782771, at *1 (D. N.J. Nov. 17, 2010). 
 
243.  Life Designs Ranch, Inc. v. Sommer, 364 P.3d 129, 138 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015). 
 
244.  MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com [http://perma.cc/LY2R-G3YA]. 
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brought claims against MySpace after they were sexually assaulted by men 
they met through the website.
245
  Plaintiffs in these cases have predicated 
liability on the fact that section 230 was inapplicable because the lawsuit 
was not related to the publication of third-party content, but based on a 
failure to implement basic safety measures to prevent sexual predators 
from communicating with minors on MySpace.
246
  This is exactly the 
argument in the present actions: plaintiffs allege that Twitter, Facebook, 
and Google are liable not for their publication of third-party content, but 
instead for harms that flow from their failure to prevent terrorists from 
using its site. A court interpreting the plain language of section 230 would 
likely recognize this distinction and thereby allow the claim to proceed. 
However, the opposite has been true. 
Both the Fifth Circuit and the California Court of Appeals have 
interpreted the claims as directed towards MySpace’s publishing, editorial, 
and/or screening capacity, despite the fact that plaintiffs pled harms 
stemming from its failure to exclude a certain type of user.
247
  As the Court 
in Doe II v. MySpace Inc. explained: 
 
That appellants characterize their complaint as one for failure to 
adopt reasonable safety measures does not avoid the immunity 
granted by section 230.  It is undeniable that appellants seek to 
hold MySpace responsible for the communications between the 
Julie Does and their assailants.  At its core, appellants want 
MySpace to regulate what appears on its Web site.  Appellants 
argue they do not “allege liability on account of MySpace’s 
exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions, such as 
editing, altering, or deciding whether or not to publish certain 
material, which is the test for whether a claim treats a website 
as a publisher . . . .”  But that is precisely what they allege; that 
is, they want MySpace to ensure that sexual predators do not 
gain access to (i.e., communicate with) minors on its Web site.  
That type of activity—to restrict or make available certain 
material—is expressly covered by section 230.
248
 
                                                          
245.  See generally Doe II v. MySpace Inc., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 148, 154 (Ct. App. 2009) 
 (consolidating four cases); MySpace, Inc. I, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 848. 
 
246.  MySpace, Inc. I, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 848. 
 
247.  Id.; see also Doe II v. MySpace Inc., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 148. 
 
248.  Doe II v. MySpace Inc., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 156–57 (emphasis added). 
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It did not matter that plaintiffs tried to shift the focus to the resultant harm: 
“Plaintiffs’ allegations that MySpace knew sexual predators were using the 
service to communicate with minors and failed to react appropriately can 
be analogized to Zeran’s claims that AOL failed to act quickly enough to 
remove the ads and to prevent the posting of additional ads after AOL was 
on notice that the content was false.”
249
  Both courts ultimately held that 
the allegations were merely another way of claiming that MySpace was 
liable for publishing the communications, which was enough to trigger 
section 230 immunity.
250
 
The analogy here is clear.  Social media can make a strong argument 
that plaintiffs bringing claims under the ATA are attempting to skirt around 
section 230 by characterizing the claim as one based on the ability of 
terrorists to use their platforms, instead of one based on the content of the 
posts, videos, and/or tweets.  However, in the end, this type of plaintiff is 
really premising liability on the fact that social media published 
information created by terrorists. 
Even though Twitter ignored this distinction in its Motion to Dismiss 
in the Fields case, it laid some groundwork that could support such an 
argument.
251
  In Fields, Twitter argued that the allegations that it failed to 
take “meaningful action to stop” terrorist use of its site by “censoring user 
content,” “shutting down . . . ISIS-linked accounts,” or blocking ISIS 
related accounts from “springing right back up” is “precisely the kind of 
activity for which Congress intended to grant absolution with the passage 
of section 230.”
252
 
It takes the argument too far to suggest that Congress intended to 
provide immunity to social media even when terrorists use it to spread 
propaganda, recruit, and fundraise.  However, the first stated goal of the 
statute is “to promote the continued development of the Internet and other 
interactive computer services and other interactive media” and a dismissal 
                                                          
 
249.  Id. at 156.  
 
250.  Id.; MySpace, Inc. II, 528 F.3d at 420. 
 
251.  See generally Defendant Twitter, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss, Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 
No. 3:16-cv-00213-WHO (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2016). 
 
252.  Id. at 15 (“Whatever theory or label Plaintiff invokes, ‘such conduct is publishing 
conduct,’ and ‘[S]ection 230 protects from liability any activity that can be boiled down to 
deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online.’”). 
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on section 230 grounds would further this goal. 
 
C.  A Narrow Reading Could Frustrate  
Congress’s Goals in Enacting Section 230 
 
If plaintiffs can successfully defeat a section 230 defense, the result 
could be dire for the technology industry.  It would essentially stifle the 
development of any interactive service that seeks to provide an 
unmoderated service that is open to proliferating speech, which is exactly 
what section 230 sought to prevent.  Recognizing this, in response to the 
case brought by Ms. Fields, Twitter made the policy argument that if it 
“were potentially subject to liability for every third-party communication, 
it would face enormous pressure to transform its open platform into a 
tightly restricted and heavily censored one—or to shut down altogether.”
253
  
Aaron Mackey, a legal fellow at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
commented that: “It has the potential to escalate and require a lot of 
changes to technology companies, shutting off whole swaths of access to 
regions of the world and to types of people.”
254
  Indeed, if future plaintiffs 
bring ATA claims against social media and are successful, it would 
dramatically redefine “free speech” on social networks.  Such a shift would 
impact not only the way social media reviews content, but also the very 
way these sites allow users to interact with one another, publish content 
immediately, and enjoy substantial freedom in postings. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
There can be no doubt that cutting off terrorist groups’ ability to 
communicate, fundraise, and spread propaganda is critical to their defeat.  
But, premising liability on the basis that social media companies provide a 
platform for millions of people to use, a fraction of whom are terrorists, 
has grave consequences.  These consequences extend not just to social 
media companies, but also to any web-based communication and support 
companies—essentially to any company that supplies any of the tools and 
instrumentalities DFTOs may use.  The problem is particularly acute for 
social media companies, however, where the business model relies on the 
                                                          
253.  Id. at 10. 
 
254.  Hamza Shaban, Twitter Sued For Helping Explosive Growth of ISIS, BUZZFEED 
NEWS (Jan. 15, 2016, 12:57 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/hamzashaban/lawsuit-blaming-
twitter-for-isis-attack-draws-allegations-fr#.tyQkMAa8M [http://perma.cc/BL6E-AN3M]. 
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company allowing its users the freedom to communicate with one another 
with little involvement, interaction, or oversight by the administrator.  A 
finding of liability would fundamentally change the way these systems 
operate.  The companies would be forced to take on not just a more active 
role, but a very proactive role in determining who its users are and 
monitoring suspicious posts.  The ability to speak freely and without 
censure online would shrink and the very nature of social networking 
would dramatically change. 
If the United States government can identify specific social media 
accounts used to further terrorist efforts, those platforms should work with 
the government to shut them down.  However, it does not follow that social 
media and other web services should shoulder the burden of identifying all 
terrorists on their platforms or face civil liability for terror attacks. 
This is particularly true where Congress has immunized content 
providers from liability for third-party posts to specifically promote the 
growth and development of the Internet.  This policy is not in conflict with 
the policy of preventing terrorismit is in conflict with the award of civil 
liability for terrorist acts made by users of that service.  If courts choose to 
favor the latter policy, it does little to shut down terrorist networks.  
Instead, it changes the nature of social media platforms into highly 
censored or nonexistent forums of communication.  Or worse, it shuts them 
down altogether, which is precisely what Congress sought to prevent with 
section 230.  For this reason, claims under the ATA for civil liability 
against social media platforms predicated on allowing terrorists to use its 
services should be dismissed under section 230. 
 
